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ARTICLES
HONING OUR KRAFT?: RECONCILING
VARIATIONS IN THE REMEDIAL TREATMENT OF
WEINGARTEN VIOLATIONS
Michael D. Moberly*and Andrea G. Lisenbee**

I. INTRODUCTION

Title I of the Labor Management Relations Act,' originally enacted
and still commonly referred to as the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or the "Act"), 2 is the nation's most significant and comprehensive labor management legislation. 3 Among other things, the Act established the right of private sector employees to organize and bargain
collectively 4 and otherwise act in concert with one another in their dealings with an employer.5 The Act also created the National Labor Rela" B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix,
Arizona.
. B.A., University of Puget Sound; J.D., University of Washington; Associate, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix, Arizona.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
2. See Crilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 529 F.2d 1355, 1358 (3d Cir. 1976); Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (E.D.N.Y.
1966).
3. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969) (describing the NLRA as "our most comprehensive national labor scheme"); Falls Stamping & Welding Co. v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agri. Implement Workers, 485 F. Supp. 1097, 1135
n.13 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (describing the NLRA as "the primary federal statute regulating labormanagement relations").
4. See Crilly, 529 F.2d at 1358 (noting that the Act "guaranteed employees the right to organize and bargain collectively"); NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610, 615 (1st Cir. 1963)
(observing that "the basic philosophy of the Act... is the encouragement of collective-as opposed
to individual-bargaining").
5. See In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 955 F.2d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussing the
"right of employees to act in concert against their own employer over a legitimate issue of working
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tions Board ("NLRB" or the "Board"), 6 and charged the Board with primary responsibility for administering and enforcing the substantive provisions of the Act.7
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA8 makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with its employees' right under Section 7 of the
Act "to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 9 Other provisions of the
Act authorize unfair labor practice claims to be presented to the Board,'(
and provide for the Board to conduct evidentiary hearings in connection
with those claims. 1 If the Board finds that an employer has committed
an unfair labor practice, 12 the Act generally authorizes the Board to
award the aggrieved employee affirmative relief, including reinstatement
and backpay. 13
conditions under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act").
6. See NLRB v. Local 264, Laborers' Int'l Union, 529 F.2d 778, 782 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The
NLRA, popularly characterized as the Wagner Act, was approved by Congress in 1935. The Wagner Act created the National Labor Relations Board .. ") (citation omitted).
7. See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952) ("Congress has made the Board the only
party entitled to enforce the Act."); Baker Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 759 F.2d 1219, 1222 (5th Cir. 1985)
("Congress has charged the Board with the primary responsibility for enforcing the Act.").
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000). In pertinent part, Section 8(a)(1) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section [7] .... " Id.
9. Id. § 157. Section 7 is a "fundamental provision of the Act." NLRB v. Modem Carpet
Indus., Inc., 611 F.2d 811, 813 (10th Cir. 1979). Indeed, the employee rights protected by that provision are generally deemed to be of "overriding importance" in construing and applying the NLRA.
Gilbert v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 1438, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But see Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d
313, 318 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The prerogatives conferred by Section 7 are important, but not absolute.
If an effort to further Section 7 rights conflicts with other, equally solemn rights, the law demands a
reasonable accommodation."), rev 'd,502 U.S. 527 (1992).
10. See Kirk v. Transp. Workers Union, 934 F. Supp. 775, 794 (S.D. Tex. 1995) ("The Act
defines certain unfair labor practices and mandates a procedure through the National Labor Relations Board ... to process and remedy unfair labor practices."). For an academic discussion of the
Board's procedures, see Dennis R. Nolan & Richard I. Lehr, Improving NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Procedures, 57 TEX. L. REv. 47 (1979).
11. See NLRB v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 265 (1938) ("By § 10 (b) the
Board is given authority to hear complaints of unfair labor practices on the evidence .... ") (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)); S.E. Overton Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 115 F. Supp. 764, 774
(W.D. Mich. 1953) (noting that the Board has "full authority to hear charges of alleged unfair labor
practices").
12. The federal courts generally have no jurisdiction "to determine what is or is not an unfair
labor practice," but instead "must defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB." Kirk, 934
F. Supp. at 794; see also S.E. Overton Co., 115 F. Supp. at 774 ("Congress in creating the National
Labor Relations Board has given it [the] exclusive right to determine whether any particular acts
constitute unfair labor practices as defined by the Act .....
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000):
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that
any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair la-
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In its landmark ruling in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 14 the Supreme Court held that the Section 7 right of an employee to act in concert with other employees includes the right to the assistance of a union
representative at an investigatory interview the employee reasonably believes may result in the imposition of discipline. 5 Although the underlying right to union representation at an investigatory interview is now
well-established,1 6 the full implications of that right continue to be de-7
bated more than a quarter of a century after Weingarten was decided.'
Among the issues that remain unresolved is the proper remedy for an
employer's violation of
an employee's right to representation at an in8
vestigatory interview.'
This article addresses that question, which has been described as "a
remedial issue of first rank importance."' 19 The article begins with a gen-

bor practice, then the Board shall... take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate the policies of [the
Act] ....

14. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). Both the Board and the courts have characterized Weingarten as a
seminal decision. See Spartan Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1980); Epilepsy
Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 677 (2000), enforced in part and rev'd in part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904 (2002).
15. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262.
16. See United States Postal Serv., 245 N.L.R.B. 901, 912 (1979) ("It is well established that
an employee has a fight to request representation as a condition of participation in an interview
where the employee reasonably believes that the interview will result in disciplinary action.") (citing Weingarten).
17. See Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1021 (1982) (Hunter, Member, concurring and dissenting) ("[T]he Board has struggled with an ever increasing number and variety of
problems arising from the attempted exercise of Weingarten rights in the workplace."); Amoco
Chems. Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 394, 397 (1978) ("[T]he scope of the right to representation at employer interviews of employees is a very difficult question, subject to many qualifications and conditions .... ); LaDawn L. Ostmann, Comment, Union Rights, No Dues: In re Epilepsy Foundation
and the NLRB's Extension of Weingarten Rights to Nonunion Employees, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1309,
1323 (2001) ("Weingarten left many questions unanswered, thus leading the Board to a myriad of
different interpretations.").
18. See Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargainingand the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L.
REv. 245, 280 n. 131 (1987) (noting that the "legal development of the Weingarten doctrine has
been troubled and controversial," and referring specifically to the "controversy [that] has surrounded the proper remedy for a Weingarten violation"); Carlton J. Snow, Collective Agreements
and Individual Contracts Employment in Labor Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 319, 342 (Supp. 2002)
("In addition to defining the scope of the right, difficult remedial issues have arisen in the unionized
setting when the right has been violated.").
19. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United Steel Workers, 78 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 921, 927 (1982) (Garrett, Arb.); see also John C. Truesdale, Recent Issues and Trends in
NLRB Decisions, Address Before A Labor Law Conference in Columbia, Mo. (Oct. 3, 1980), in
LAB. REL. Y.B., 1980, at 176, 180 (describing "the appropriate remedy when a Weingarten violation has occurred" as one of the "difficult issues that come before the Board").
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eral discussion of Weingarten20 and Congress' subsequent codification
of that decision in legislation extending many of the NLRA's protections
to federal government employees. 2' The article then describes the evolution of the Board's remedial treatment of Weingarten violations,22 and
examines the statutory underpinnings of the Board's current approach to
the issue. 23 After exploring the policy implications of the Board's various remedial approaches to Weingarten,2 4 the article ultimately concludes that employees shown to have been disciplined as the result of information obtained at an unlawful investigatory interview should be
entitled to have that discipline rescinded,25 and should also be made
whole for any economic losses suffered as the result of the discipline.2 6

20. For a prior academic discussion of Weingarten and subsequent Board cases applying the
Court's decision, see Leslie Ann- Margolin, Employee Right to Representation in Employer Interviews: Weingarten and Progeny, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 226 (1981).
21. The NLRA itself generally applies only to private sector employment. See Gomez v. Virgin Islands, 882 F.2d 733, 736 (3d Cir. 1989). However, many of the NLRA's protections were extended to employees of the United States Postal Service by the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970.
See Glenn v. United States Postal Serv., 939 F.2d 1516, 1519 (1 th Cir. 1991); United States Postal
Serv., 200 N.L.R.B. 413, 414 n.4 (1972). In addition, although Postal Service employees are the
only federal employees specifically covered by the NLRA, see Blaze v. Payne, 819 F.2d 128, 130
(5th Cir. 1987), similar protections were ultimately provided to other federal employees by separate
legislation patterned after the NLRA. See Milner v. Bolger, 546 F. Supp. 375, 378 & n.3 (E.D. Cal.
1982); Yates v. United States Soldiers' & Airmen's Home, 533 F. Supp. 461,463 (D.D.C. 1982).
22. For a broader discussion of Weingarten's evolution, see David L. Gregory, The Employee's Right to Representation During Employer InvestigatoryInterviews: A Critical Analysis of
the Evolution of Weingarten Principles,28 VILL. L. REV. 572 (1983).
23. The Board's remedial authority is derived from the Act itself. See NLRB v. Hartman, 774
F.2d 1376, 1387 n.14 (9th Cir. 1985). However, in recognition of the need for flexibility in addressing the various unfair labor practices that arise under the Act, the "legislative imprint on the Board's
remedial powers has.., been lightly laid." Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029
(1962); see also Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir. 1951) ("[I]t is
uniformly recognized that the variable pattern of [unlawful] practices revealed in cases before the
Board requires a correspondingly variable set of remedial orders, if the Board is to fulfill its duty of
taking appropriate steps to dissipate the effects of unfair labor practices.").
24. For many years the Board itself did "not explain[] its rationale for this variation in remedy." Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1048, 1056 (1982).
25. See Penn-Dixie Steel Corp.,253 N.L.R.B. 91, 96 (1980) ("The Board has ordered an offending employer to expunge from its records any references to any disciplinary action taken on the
basis of interviews conducted in violation of employees' Weingarten rights.")
26. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 663, 669 (1984):
[Hiaving found that the [employer] after denying [the employee] his Weingarten rights,
suspended him for 2 weeks, without pay, based on information obtained from him at the
unlawful interview itself, I shall order that the unlawful suspension be rescinded ... and
that he be made whole for any loss of pay he suffered as a result of this unlawful suspension, with the payment of interest.
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II. THE RIGHT TO UNION REPRESENTATION UNDER WEINGARTEN
In NLRB v. J Weingarten, Inc.,27 the Supreme Court held that an
employee is entitled to union representation, upon request, during an investigatory interview the employee reasonably believes may result in
disciplinary action.28 The case arose when a retail store employee requested but was denied the presence of a union representative during an
29
investigatory interview concerning suspected theft from her employer.
Following the interview, the employee reported the details of the interview to her shop steward and other union representatives, and an unfair
labor practice charge was filed.3 °
The Board found that the employer's denial of the employee's request for union representation constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it interfered with the Section
7 right of employees to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or
protection.3 1 The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order,32
concluding that "[w]hile a basic purpose of section 7 is to allow employees to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection,
such a need does not arise at an investigatory interview. 3 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 34 and reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision,35 remanding the case to the lower court with instructions

27, 420U.S. 251 (1975).
28. Id. at 267; see also Spartan Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1980)
("Weingarten makes clear... that an employee is entitled to request and to receive union representation during an investigatory interview which he reasonably believes will result in disciplinary action.").
29. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 254.
30. Id. at 256.
31. See J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 450, enforcement denied, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 251 (1975), overruled by Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000),
enforced in part, rev"d in part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir.2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904 (2002).
32. The Board itself "lacks the authority to enforce its remedial orders." United States v.
Palumbo Bros.,145 F.3d 850, 870 (7th Cir. 1998). Section 10(e) of the NLRA instead "requires the
Board to seek enforcement of its order[s] in a court of appeals." Alwin Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d
133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2000)).
33. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 251
(1975). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten, employers frequently argued that "an
employee was not entitled to union representation until, unless, and after management had levied a
disciplinary penalty." Texaco, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 633, 642 (1980), enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.
1981); see also Dep't of Air Force v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 75 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
994, 996 (1980) (Hart, Arb.) ("Traditionally the employee had a right to representation only after
the fact of management investigation and action.").
34. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
35. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 253.
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to enforce the Board's order. 36 The Court held that the "action of an employee in seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at a
confrontation with his employer clearly falls within the literal wording
of § 7 that 'employees shall have the right.

. .

to engage in... concerted

activities for the purpose of... mutual aid or protection."' 37 The Court
reasoned that the presence of a union representative would protect the
interests of the employee participating in the interview by ensuring that
the employer does not impose discipline unjustly.3 8 In addition, the rep39

resentative's presence assures other employees in the bargaining unit
that they would also receive the union's aid and protection during similar interviews.40
In deferring to the Board's construction of the NLRA, 4 1 the Weingarten Court emphasized that it is the province of the Board, and not the
courts, to determine whether or not a need for representation exists in
light of changing industrial practices and "the Board's cumulative experience in dealing with labor-management relations. ''42 According to
the Court, the Board's holding was a permissible construction of the
NLRA, and the Board's special competence in the field justified the deference accorded its determination.4 3 In addition, the Court recognized
that the Board's construction of the Act was consistent with many collective bargaining agreements, as well as prior arbitration decisions sustaining the right to union representation at an investigatory interview."
36. Id. at 268.
37. Id. at 260 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 1973)).
38. Id at 260-61.
39. The employees represented by a union are not limited to those who are members of the
union, but include all of the employees in the bargaining unit the union elected or is otherwise designated to represent. See Roscello v. Southwest Airlines Co., 726 F.2d 217, 224 (5th Cir. 1984). A
"bargaining unit" has been defined as "a grouping of two or more employees aggregated for the
assertion of organizational rights or for collective bargaining... " Salary Policy Employee Panel v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 149 F.3d 485, 492 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
448-49 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992)). One court has stated: "The touchstone of an appropriate
bargaining unit is the finding that all of its members have a common interest in the terms and conditions of employment, to warrant their inclusion in a single unit to choose a bargaining agent."
Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1966).
40. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 261.
41. One Board member has asserted that "the Section 7 right of an employee to request the
presence of his union representative at a disciplinary interview was firmly established by Board law
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten, and.. . Weingarten merely reaffirmed the
existence of that Section 7 right." Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 995, 1000 (1979)
(Penello, Member, dissenting). But cf Ereno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239, 241 (1975) ("Weingarten
involved a change in the Board's interpretation of the statute ....
42. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266.
43. Id.
44. See id at 267.
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The right to union representation at an investigatory interview was
subsequently codified as a matter of federal sector employment when
Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute ("FSLMRS" or the "Statute") 45 a few years after Weingarten was
decided.46 The FSLMRS, which was patterned closely after the NLRA,47
established the collective bargaining rights of most federal government
employees, 48 and Section 14(a)(2)(B) of the Statute4 9 specifically provides that those employees are entitled to union representation at investigatory interviews that they reasonably believe may result in disciplinary action. 50 Congress' intent in enacting this "so-called Weingarten
provision '" was to provide federal employees with representational
rights comparable to those afforded to private sector employees by the

45. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-35 (2000). Prior to Congress' adoption of the FSLMRS, "there existed
no comparable right. . . to representation during an investigative interview" in the federal sector.
I.R.S., 4 F.L.R.A. 237, 249 (1980); see also Dep't of the Air Force v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 75 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 994, 997 (1980) (Hart, Arb.) (noting that prior to the enactment of the
FSLMRS, the agency with primary responsibility for overseeing labor relations in the federal sector
"specifically rejected extending the Weingarten decision to federal employees").
46. See Def. Criminal Investigative Serv. v. FLRA, 855 F.2d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Section
7114(a)(2)(B) [of the FSLMRS] was adopted by Congress in 1978 shortly after the decision in
Weingarten and purports on its face to confer Weingarten rights on all federal employees in a bargaining unit."). The legislative history of Congress' codification of Weingarten in the FSLMRS is
summarized in Dep' of Transp., FAA, Mike Monroney Aeronautical COr., No. 86 FSIP 56, 1987
FSIP LEXIS 42, at **65-72 (Feb. 10, 1987).
47. See Rizzitelli v. FLRA, 212 F.3d 710, 712 n.1(2d Cir. 2000) ("Congress intended the
FSLMRS to be the public-sector counterpart to the NLRA and structured the respective authority
similarly."); Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 991 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The FSLMRS is modeled after the National Labor Relations Act ...").
48. See United States Dep't of Energy v. FLRA, 880 F.2d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the Statute "codifies the collective bargaining rights of federal employees"); Library of
Cong. v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Congress intended the new statutory system to... protect[] the right of public employees to organize and bargain collectively .. ").See
generally Lipscomb v. FLRA, 333 F.3d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the FSLMRS "governs
the labor relations of most federal employees").
49. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B) (2000). For the sake of convenience, provisions of the FSLMRS
are often referred to "without inclusion of the initial '71' of the statutory reference," so that §
7116(d), for example, is "referred to, simply, as '§ 16(d)."' United States Dep't of Def., Def. Contract Audit Agency, No. BN-CA-20172, 1993 FLRA LEXIS 245, at *1 n.1 (Sept. 30, 1993).
50. See Dep't of Justice, I.N.S., Border Patrol, 36 F.L.R.A. 41, 62 (1990). In particular, the
statute provides that a bargaining unit employee is entitled to union representation at "any examination of [the] employee ... by a representative of the [employer] in connection with an investigation
if-(i) the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action
against the employee; and (ii) the employee requests representation." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B)
(2000).
51. FLRA v. United States Dep't of Justice, 137 F.3d 683, 687 (2d Cir. 1997); see also United
States Dep't of Justice, I.N.S. v. FLRA, 975 F.2d 218, 226 n.I I (5th Cir. 1992) (describing
§ 7114(a)(2)(B)(i) of the FSLMRS as "[t]he 'Weingarten' provision").
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52
Weingarten decision itself.

III. THE BOARD'S INITIAL REMEDIAL APPROACH
TO WEINGARTEN VIOLATIONS

In the first cases involving a denial of union representation that
arose after Weingarten was decided, 53 the Board, without offering any
supporting analysis, 54 generally afforded no affirmative relief to employees disciplined for conduct that was the subject of interviews conducted
in violation of their Weingarten rights.5 5 However, in subsequent cases
such as Certified Grocers of California, Ltd.56 and Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co.,57 the Board, with equally little analysis, 58 returned the
parties to the status quo by rescinding disciplinary actions taken in cases
59
involving Weingarten violations.
The apparent conflict in these cases was noted by a Board adminis-

52. See United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431, 438-39 (1990);
see also D.C. Dep't of Corrections v. Fraternal Order of Police, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 843, 845
(1996) (Rogers, Arb.) ("The fundamental statutory basis of and the qualifications the Court imposed
through the Weingarten rule is [sic] the same in the public sector, the federal sector and the private
sector of labor relations.").
53. In the first few years after the Court's decision, the Board "had several opportunities to
apply the Weingarten [sic] test." Good Hope Refineries, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 380, 383 (1979); see
also PPG Indus., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1165 (1980) ("The parameters of employee rights under
Weingarten have been set forth in numerous Board cases since 1975 ... .
54. One federal judge has asserted that "the Board should be required to articulate its reasons
for choosing one remedial course over another." NLRB v. Creative Food Design Ltd., 852 F.2d
1295, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, J., dissenting).
55. See United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 154 (1979) (citing Detroit Edison Co.,
217 N.L.R.B. 622 (1975), Keystone Steel & Wire, 217 N.L.R.B. 995 (1975), and Mobil Oil Corp.,
196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972)). In an early case arising under the FSLMRS, the agency charged with
responsibility for enforcing that act similarly held that the protection afforded by Weingarten "does
not, ipsofacto, require [a] status quo ante remedy." United States Dep't of Navy, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Logistics Base, 4 F.L.R.A. 397, 407 (1980).
56. 227 N.L.R.B. 1211, 1213-14 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978).
57. 227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977).
58. See La. Council No. 17, 250 N.L.R.B. 880, 899 (1980) ("In fashioning the make-whole
remedy in Certified Grocers, the Board did not articulate its rationale."). Although the Board in
Southwestern Bell offered little explanation for its decision, it explicitly rejected the administrative
law judge's refusal to award reinstatement and backpay to employees disciplined after their Weingarten rights were violated, noting that a "make-whole remedy [was] necessary to restore the status
quo ante." Southwestern Bell TeL Co., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1223 n. I.
59. See United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. at 154 (discussing Certified Grocers and
Southwestern Bell); see also Gregory, supra note 22, at 615 ("The initial approach adopted by the
Board after Weingarten was to grant full make-whole remedies to the employee if the employer was
found to have engaged in an unlawful investigatory interview without the requested representation.") (citing Certified Grocers).
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trative law judge 60 in United States PostalService.6 1 In a decision subsequently affirmed by the Board itself,62 the judge held that an employee
disciplined after being denied union representation at an investigatory
interview should be made whole 63 "[a]t least unless the employer can affirmatively show that [it] would have taken the same action even if the
union representative had been permitted to attend ....
An award of make-whole relief, typically in the form of reinstatement and backpay, is the Board's traditional remedy when an employee
has been disciplined or discharged in violation of the Act. 65 The purpose
of the remedy is "to return the unlawfully discharged employee to the
status quo that would have existed absent the unfair labor practice. 66 In
Postal Service, the Board extended this remedy to Weingarten violations, 67 holding that in cases involving a denial of union representation it
would ordinarily require "restoration of the status quo ante by requiring
affirmative correction of [any resulting adverse] personnel action. 68
The question left open in Postal Service-whether an employer
could avoid an award of make-whole relief by showing that its Weingarten violation did not prejudice the employee 69-was subsequently re60. Unfair labor practice hearings under the NLRA are typically held before administrative
law judges, whose decisions are then subject to Board review. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.15, 102.16,
102.34 & 102.45(a) (2003); see also Hoeber v. KNZ Constr., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 451, 454 (E.D. Pa.
1995) ("After the administrative law judge issues a ruling, the Board must affirm the decision and
order.").
61. 241 N.L.R.B. 141 (1979).
62. /d. at 141.
63. Id. at 157. The Supreme Court has noted that "making... employees whole for losses
suffered on account of an unfair labor practice" furthers the public policy embodied in the Act. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952).
64. United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. at 154.
65. See Viking Indus. Sec., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 146, 149 (1998) (Brame, Member, dissenting
in part); Dean Gen. Contractors, 285 N.L.R.B. 573, 573 (1987).
66. Dean Gen. Contractors,285 N.L.R.B. at 573; see also Local Union No. 418, Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 249 N.L.R.B. 898, 901 (1980) (observing that "the broad remedy of 'make
whole' is to be defined by the status .. . the employee would have enjoyed but for the wrongful
conduct").
67. Because the employee in Postal Service had not been discharged or suspended, the remedy in that case did "not call for ... reinstatement or for any backpay," but for the rescission of a
written warning that had been issued to the employee. United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. at
156. However, make-whole relief is not limited to reinstatement and backpay, but also may involve
the "expungement of... disciplinary records." Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 262 N.L.R.B.
970, 975 n. 14 (1982); see also Bernard Dobranski, The Right of Union Representation in Employer
Interviews: A Post-WeingartenAnalysis, 26 ST. Louis U. L.J. 295, 326 (1982) (noting that a makewhole remedy "includ[es] reinstatement of the employee, if discharged, or rescission of a lesser
form of punishment").
68. United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. at 154.
69. See Iron Workers Local Union 377, 326 N.L.R.B. 375, 394 (1998) ("[A] make-whole
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solved in the employer's favor in Kraft Foods, Inc.70 In Kraft, the Board
held that the General Counsel could establish a prima facie case for
make-whole relief7 ' by demonstrating that an employee was disciplined
for conduct that was the subject of an interview conducted in violation of
Weingarten.72 If such a showing was made, the burden shifted to the
employer to establish that its disciplinary decision was not based on information obtained at the unlawful interview. 73 If the employer satisfied
this burden, make-whole relief would not be ordered, and the remedy in74
stead would be limited to the issuance of a cease-and-desist order.
Thus,
under the remedial test fashioned in Kraft, the right of an employee to
union representation during a Weingarten interview does not necessarily protect the employee from discipline merely because the right was
abridged. The test recognizes that there may be situations in which the
decision to discipline was based on information obtained independent
of the interview./5
The remedial approach to Weingarten violations adopted in Kraft
and other similar Board cases 76 was intended to prevent employers from
remedy is appropriate only where.., the grievant suffered 'damage' from the unfair [labor practice]
for which he or she should be made whole."); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1461
(1976) (stating that make-whole relief "simply seeks to expunge any prejudice that may have resulted" from an employer's unlawful conduct).
70. 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980), overruled by Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222-23
(1984). For prior academic discussions of Kraft, see Dobranski, supra note 67, at 324-27; Gregory,
supra note 22, at 615-16; Truesdale, supra note 19, at 176.
71. Under section 3(d) of the NLRA, the Board's General Counsel is authorized to investigate
unfair labor practice charges and issue complaints based on those charges, and to prosecute those
complaints on behalf of the charging parties in proceedings before the Board. See 29 U.S.C. §
153(d) (2000). Thus, "lilt is the General Counsel, [and] not the charging party, who determines the
theory of the case." Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 323 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1030 n.6 (1997).
72. See Kraft, 251 N.L.R.B. at 598.
73. Id.; see also Montgomery Ward & Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 826, 826 (1981) ("Under Kraft, the
burden ... [is on the employer to] demonstrat[e] that its decision to discipline the employee in question was not based on information obtained at the unlawful interview."), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part,664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1981).
74. See Kraft, 251 N.L.R.B. at 598. It has occasionally been suggested that under Section
10(c) of the Act, "upon finding that an unfair labor practice has been committed, the Board must
issue an order 'requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice .... ' Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 973, 975-76 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (emphasis added) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000)). However "the view that Section 10(c) of the Act mandates issuance of a
cease-and-desist order, whenever there is a finding that an unfair labor practice has occurred, is not
a unanimous one." Lucky Stores, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 1138, 1147 (1986).
75. Dobranski, supra note 67, at 326.
76. See generally Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1984) (Zimmerman, Member,
concurring) (referring to "Kraft Foods and its progeny").
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benefiting from violations of their employees' Weingarten rights.77 The
Board sought to achieve this result by patterning the remedy for such
violations after "the remedy used in criminal cases, where Miranda
rights of suspects are violated and the statements obtained therein are not
permitted to be utilized., 78 As the Board explained:
The implication, if not the direct teaching, of [the Kraft Foods] doctrine is that if lawfully obtained evidence of employee wrongdoing and
unlawfully obtained admissions are commingled by an employer in arriving at a decision to discharge, the fruit of the poisonous tree taints
the lawful
evidence and renders the employer liable for a full rem79
edy.
The Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA" or the "Authority,") the federal agency patterned after the NLRB 80 that is primarily responsible for enforcing the FSLMRS,8' has expressed a similar view of
the right to union representation at an investigatory interview. 2 In fact,
Congress itself briefly considered including a provision in the FSLMRS
that would have prevented any information obtained during an interview
conducted in violation of an employee's Weingarten rights from being
used as the basis for disciplining the employee.8 3 This statutory provi77. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward, 254 N.L.R.B. at 827 n.4 (noting that a refusal to award
make-whole relief in accordance with Kraft "would permit the [employer] to benefit directly from
the commission of proscribed conduct; namely, forcing [an employee] to submit to [an] unlawful
interview, during which information [is] obtained for which he [is subsequently] disciplined").
78. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 42, 55 (1990) (footnote omitted); see also Ill. Bell Tel.
Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 932, 939 (1980) (suggesting that "statements taken in violation of an employee's
[Weingarten] rights [may] become 'fruit of a poisonous tree,' to borrow a phrase from constitutional
law relating to coerced confessions and illegal searches and seizures"), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part,674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
79. Ill.
Bell Tel. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 148, 150 (1985), enforced sub nom. Communication
Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1986).
80. See Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 810 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (observing
that "the FLRA was modeled on the NLRB"); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 785 F.2d
333, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Congress intended the FLRA's role in adjudicating unfair labor practice
cases in the federal sector to be similar to that of the NLRB's in the private sector.").
81. See Lipscomb v. FLRA, 333 F.3d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 2003); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 712 F.2d 640, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1983). "Among its powers, the FLRA has authority to
determine appropriate bargaining units, to supervise representational elections, to hear and resolve
complaints of unfair labor practices, and ...to resolve issues relating to the duty to bargain in good
faith." Library of Cong. v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (footnotes omitted).
82. See, e.g., Dep't of Treasury, Bureau of ATF, 24 F.L.R.A. 521, 532 (1986) ("[E]xclusion
of a union representative from [an] ...investigation, coupled with the [employer's] potential for use
of the fruits of such investigation in the imposition of discipline, would effectively nullify [the]
rights recognized in Weingarten ...").
83. See F.A.A., 35 F.L.R.A. 645 (1990):
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sion effectively would have codified the Board's decision in Kraft by
making the FSLMRS remedy for Weingarten violations "similar to the
exclusionary rule in criminal law."8 4
Although Congress ultimately did not enact this provision,85 there is
no indication in the FSLMRS's legislative history of any congressional
disagreement with the Board's analysis in Kraft.8 6 Thus, despite the absence of any explicit statutory authority to do so,87 the FLRA has generally prohibited employers from taking disciplinary action against employees "as a result of any information acquired as a result of their
examinations88...when [the] employees requested and were denied representation.,
IV. THE BOARD'S REVISED APPROACH TO REMEDYING
WEINGAR TEN VIOLATIONS

InTaracorp,89 the Board overruled its prior decision in Kraft to the
extent Kraft had provided a make-whole remedy to Weingarten victims
Should [Weingarten] rights be violated, [the FSLMRS would have] provided its own
sanction: "[A]ny statement made by or evidence obtained during questioning of an employee may not be used as evidence in the course of any action for suspension, removal
or reduction in rank or pay subsequently taken against the employee."
Id. at 661 (internal ellipses omitted) (quoting H.R. 3793, 95th Cong. § 7171(c) (1978)); see also
Robert M. Tobias & William Harness, Federalizing Weingarten: An NTEU Perspective, 31 How.
LJ. 271, 277 (1988) (noting that under the proposed legislation, "any statement or evidence obtained
during questioning could not be used in any disciplinary action against the employee").
84. F.A.A., 35 F.L.R.A. at 661 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-920, at 5 (1978)); cf Communications Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that "the Board ...appl[ied] an
exclusionary rule... in Kraft Foods").
85. See Dep 'tof Treasury, 24 F.L.R.A. at 534 (noting that "the reference[] ... to the inadmissibility of evidence gathered in the absence of representation [was] dropped" in conference committee); cf Karahalios v. Def. Language Inst., 821 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing another
proposed FSLMRS provision eliminated by the conference committee on the ground that the matter
at issue was to "be considered at least in the first instance by the.. .Authority") (quoting H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 95-1717, at 157 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2860, 2891).
86. Instead, "Congress, as it so often does, simply left [the] matter[] to be fleshed out by the
Authority," rather than "erect[ing] an explicit [evidentiary] barrier on its own." F.A.A., 35 F.L.R.A.
at 662; see also FDIC v. FLRA, 977 F.2d 1493, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (observing that "the language
of the FSLMRS exudes a broad congressional delegation of discretion to the FLRA to fashion appropriate remedies for unfair labor practices").
87. Although the statutory prohibition on the use of evidence obtained in violation of Weingarten was deleted from the FSLMRS prior to its passage, the Statute does contain a provision authorizing the FLRA to "require [employers] to take any remedial action [the FLRA] considers ap3
propriate to carry out the policies of [the Statute]." 5 U.S.C. § 7105(g)( ) (2000).
88. United States Dep't of Justice, Nos. BN-CA-50149 etal., 1996 FLRA LEXIS 120, at
**25-26 (July 30, 1996), applicationdeniedon other grounds, 137 F.3d 683 (2d Cir. 1997).
89. 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984).
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who were discharged for "cause." 90 Under the revised approach to remedying Weingarten violations the Board adopted in Taracorp, "[i]f the
employer violates Weingarten by excluding the union's representative
from a disciplinary interview and fires the employee solely because of
the employee's misconduct, the Board enters only a cease and desist order." 91
The analysis in Taracorp was premised primarily upon the Board's
interpretation of Section 10(c) of the Act,9 2 which states that "[n]o order
of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual.., who
has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any backpay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause., 93 The
Board has interpreted this provision to prohibit an award of make-whole
relief to an employee disciplined for cause, 94 even if the employee's Section 7 rights have been violated by the employer. 95 In Taracorp, the
Board concluded that "typical" Weingarten cases fall within this prohibiis not an untion, 96 because in such cases "the reason for the discharge 97
misconduct.,
employee
of
type
some
but
practice,
fair labor

90. I1. Bell Tel. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 148, 148 (1985) (discussing Taracorp), enforced sub nom.
Communication Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1986).
91. Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 852.
92. Taracorp,273 N.L.R.B. at 221 ("We find that ...make-whole relief in the context of a
Weingarten violation is contrary to the specific remedial restriction contained in Section
10(c) ....
");see also Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 850 ("The Board's decision in Taracorp rests principally on its construction of a proviso to § 10(c) ....); United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431,443 (1990) (noting that the Board's reasoning in Taracorp
was "largely based" on Section 10(c)).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000).
94. See Bath Iron Works Corp., 302 N.L.R.B. 898, 913 (1991) ("[Wlhere an employee is discharged for cause within the meaning of Section 10(c), the Board is precluded from imposing a
make-whole remedy.") (citing Taracorp,273 N.L.R.B. at 222).
95. See Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. at 222:
[A]n employee discharged or disciplined for misconduct or any other nondiscriminatory
reason is not entitled to reinstatement and backpay even though the employee's Section 7
rights may have been violated by the employer in a context unrelated to the discharge or
discipline. This principle is embodied in the remedial restriction in Section 10(c) of the
Act ....
96. Id. at 223 ("[W]e are compelled to conclude that Weingarten cases fall into the category
of cases where a make-whole remedy is precluded by operation of Section 10(c).").
97. Id. (emphasis added); see also Pa. Shipbuilding Co., Nos. 4-CA-16715, 4-CA-16150 1988
NLRB GCM LEXIS 26, at *4 (Feb. 11,1988) ("[1In Weingarten cases, the employee is discharged
for violating a valid work rule; the sole unfair labor practice lies in the investigatory process.").
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1 0(c) IS QUESTIONABLE

The Board's analysis in Taracorp is not entirely persuasive. 98 For
one thing, Section 10(c) by its terms does not apply in cases that do not
involve the suspension or discharge of the employee whose Section 7
rights were violated. 99 Thus, that statutory provision imposes no apparent limitation on the Board's remedial authority in Weingarten cases in
which the employee's alleged misconduct results in the imposition of
other 1forms of discipline, 00 such as a demotion or an involuntary trans0
fer.'
Moreover, even in suspension and discharge cases, 10 2 Section 10(c)
is susceptible to an alternative interpretation that would preclude an
award of make-whole relief in Weingarten cases only "where evidence

98. See, e.g., Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 849 ("We have misgivings about the construction of § 10(c) in Taracorp...."); cf Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1169 n.31
(5th Cir. 1980) (describing as an "interesting conundrum" the question of "whether, to remedy the
abrogation of an employee's right to union representation at an interview, the Board can order his
reinstatement ... despite the fact that Section 10(c) prohibits the reinstatement of an employee who
was fired for cause").
99. See Texaco, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 633, 639 (1980) (Truesdale, Member, dissenting in part)
(noting that "Section 10(c) of the Act is not directly applicable to ...discipline short of suspension
or discharge"), enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981); cf Dover Garage 11,Inc., 237 N.L.R.B.
1015, 1019 (1978) (finding it unnecessary to decide whether a "warning issued by [a] supervisor
was ...protected by Section 10(c) of the Act"), enforcement denied 607 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1979).
100. See Airco Alloys, 249 N.L.R.B. 524, 526 (1980) ("[Weingarten] rights involve representation of employees at interviews with management where the employee reasonably expects that any
kind of discipline might follow, not just discipline involving transfers, demotions, layoffs, or discharges.") (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 156 (1979) (rejecting the employer's contention that make-whole relief was "precluded by Section 10(c) of the Act," in part because the employee whose Weingarten rights were violated had merely received a written warning,
and had "not been suspended or discharged"); cf Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 91, 95-96
(1980) (concluding that Section 10(c) did not preclude an award of reinstatement and backpay to an
employee whose resignation had been "obtained in violation of his Weingarten rights," because the
employee "was not actually discharged").
102. Itis not clear why Congress chose to limit the Board's remedial authority only in discharge and suspension cases, since reinstatement and backpay also may be awarded in cases involving other types of unlawful discipline. See, e.g., Ace Beverage Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 646, 648 (1980)
("It is uncontested that ...the Charging Party is entitled to reinstatement to his predemotion position ...and to backpay commencing on the date he was unlawfully demoted."); Montgomery Ward
& Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 482, 485 (1965) (holding that an unlawfully transferred employee was "entitled to reinstatement to his former position"). However, Congress "'most assuredly knew how to
limit the Board's authority' when it drafted Section 10(c) to include an "express limitation against
reinstatement or backpay orders [only] for employees 'suspended or discharged for cause."' Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 591 (1984) (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting) (quoting Conair
Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J., dissenting) and 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(2000)).
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independent from [the] improper interview" reveals that the employee
was disciplined for cause.10 3 This was, in fact, the Board's view of Section 10(c) prior to Taracorp,10 4 when the failure to provide union representation at an investigatory interview was typically deemed to render
unlawful an otherwise lawful discharge for cause, 10 5 and make-whole relief was available unless the employer could prove "that there was cause
for discipline based on information gathered independently of the unlawful interview."' 0 6 As one Board administrative law judge explained:
In the cases [in] which the Board has.., found a make-whole remedy
inappropriate, the employers were able to establish that the disciplinary
action taken was not based upon any information obtained during the
unlawful interview. Thus, the disciplinary actions and the
Weingarten
one another. 107

violations were completely independent of

Ironically, this is also the approach followed in several of the cases
upon which the Board in Taracorp relied when it interpreted Section
10(c) to preclude an award of make-whole relief for most Weingarten
violations. 0 8 In General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 10 9 for example, the employer argued that Section 10(c) prohibited the reinstatement of an employee whose Weingarten rights were violated." 0 Although the court
agreed that the Board's award of make-whole relief was unwarranted, it
did so because the employer had presented evidence independent of its
103. NLRB v. Kahn's & Co., 694 F.2d 1070, 1072 (6th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
104. See Truesdale, supra note 19, at 176 ("Section 10(c) of the Act prohibits the Board from
reinstating an employee who was discharged for cause, although it is well accepted that the Board
can order reinstatement where the employer would not have discovered the employee's misbehavior
but for the employer's unlawful conduct.").
105. See Kahn's & Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 25, 30 (1980), reconsiderationdenied, 256 N.L.R.B. 930
(1981), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 694 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1982):
The [employer] ... contends that Section 10(c) of the Act prohibits the Board from ordering the reinstatement of [an employee].., discharged for cause. The Board has held,
however, that an employer's unlawful refusal to allow an employee union representation
renders "unlawful what was an otherwise lawful discharge for cause," and that the appropriate remedy is reinstatement with backpay.
Id. (quoting Anchortank, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 430, 431 n.9 (1978), enforced in part and enforcement
denied in part, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980)); cf L.A. Water Treatment, 263 N.L.R.B. 244, 249
(1982) (Jenkins, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that "discipline cannot be lawful if it is based on information which is distorted because of the employer's unlawful
denial of [union] representation").
106. Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 599 (1980) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part)
(internal quotation marks omitted), overruled by Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222-23 (1984).
107. Northwest Eng'g Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 190, 198 (1982).
108. See Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. at 222 & n.1 1 (citing cases).
109. 674 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1982).
110. 1dat577.
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Weingarten violation that would have supported its termination of the
employee for cause."'
A similar result was reached in NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., 112 another case in which the Board awarded reinstatement and
backpay to an employee who was terminated after her Weingarten rights
were violated.' The employer in Illinois Bell petitioned to set aside that
14
award, arguing that it had discharged the employee for dishonesty,'
and that Section 10(c) prohibits an award of reinstatement or backpay to
employees terminated for cause."' Although the Seventh Circuit refused
to enforce the Board's remedial order," 16 it effectively held that Section
10(c) permits an award of make-whole relief to an employee purportedly
terminated for cause if the discharge was "solely dependent" upon evidence obtained during an interview conducted in violation of Weingarten." 7 The court thus remanded the case for further consideration of the
proper remedy to be imposed, 1 8 and specifically for further proceedings
"to determine whether independent evidence sufficiently supported the
[c]ompany's discharge of [the employee] for cause.' 19
111. Id. at 577-78; see also Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 148, 151 (1985) (noting that the
General Motors court refused to award make-whole relief "because ...there was sufficient independent evidence of employee wrongdoing to warrant a discharge, quite apart from the information
garnered from an illegally conducted interview"), enforced sub nom. Communication Workers v.
NLRB, 784 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1986); Gregory, supra note 22, at 618-19 ("Instead of inquiring into
whether the employee was fired for requesting union representation, the [General Motors] court
considered whether there was 'independent evidence of good cause for discharge."') (quoting Gen.
Motors, 674 F.2d at 578).
112. 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
113. 1Il. Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 932, 934-35 (1980), enforced in part and enforcement
denied in part, 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
114. Ill. Bell Tel., 674 F.2d at 623 ("[Tlhe record here establishes that the Company discharged
[the employee] . . . upon a belief that she had been dishonest ....
115. Id.at 620.
116. Id. at 623 ("[W]e enforce the Board's Order in all respects except as to reinstatement,
back pay, and expungement of [the employee's] discharge record. Enforcement of those portions of
the Order ...is denied .... ).

117. Id.; see also Gregory, supra note 22, at 619-20:
[T]he [Illinois Bell] court initially stated that it was clear that the employee had not been
discharged for requesting union representation. However, instead of concluding from
this that the Board's remedy was inappropriate, the Seventh Circuit considered, as the
Board had done in Kraft, whether the discharge could have been supported by evidence
obtained outside the interview.
Id.(footnotes omitted),
118. Ill. Bell Tel., 674 F.2d at 621.
119. Id. at 623. Because the Seventh Circuit essentially "applied the ... test set down by Kraft
in determining the propriety of a make-whole remedy," Gregory, supra note 22, at 620, the Taracorp Board's citation of Illinois Bell in overruling Kraft is particularly curious. See Taracorp Indus.,
273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222 n.l 1 (1984).
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Courts in other cases have also interpreted Section 10(c) to preclude
an award of make-whole relief only when the employer establishes,
through "evidence independent from [the] improper interview," that the
employee was discharged for cause. 120 In NLRB v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 12 1 for example, the court assumed that the Board can require an employer to show that its imposition of discipline was not based
on information obtained at an unlawful interview, but the court refused
to award backpay to an employee suspended after such an22 interview because the employer had satisfied that evidentiary burden.
Significantly, the analysis in these cases is supported by the legislative history of Section 10(c).

123

As originally enacted, that provision

contained no specific limitation on the Board's authority to remedy unfair labor practices. 124 In an effort to curtail the Board's seemingly unbridled remedial authority under the original provision, 25 the proviso
prohibiting the Board from awarding make-whole relief to employees
suspended or discharged for cause was added in 1947126 as part of the
120. NLRB v. Kahn's & Co., 694 F.2d 1070, 1072 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing General Motors
Corp.).
121. 730 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 174. In addition, although the analysis in one of the cases the Board cited in Taracorp, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1981), arguably does support its interpretation of Section 10(c), one Board administrative law judge has asserted that even
Montgomery Ward is merely a "somewhat strained" example of a court applying the "independent
evidence rule," because the court implied, even if it did not state, "that there was independent evidence of [the employee's] wrongdoing." Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 148, 151 (1985), enforced
sub nom. Communication Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1986).
123. Compare Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 674 F.2d at 623 (indicating that reinstatement and backpay
may be awarded under Section 10(c) where an employee's termination "stemmed solely from the
Company's unfair labor practice of forcing her to participate in an interview without representation"), with Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 1007, 1019 (1979) ("jN]othing in Section 10(c)'s
legislative history indicates that it was designed to curtail the Board's power to fashion remedies,
when losses of employment 'stem directly' from unfair labor practices found.") (quoting Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 217 (1964)).
124. See Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.RB. 670, 671 (1948):
Section 10(c) of the original National Labor Relations Act directed the Board to order
employers found to have engaged in conduct violative of the Act to cease and desist
from their illegal conduct. It also gave the Board power to order employers to take affirmative action to remedy the unfair labor practices committed, a power limited only by
the requirement that the remedy effectuate the policies of the Act.
125. See NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 295 (2d Cir. 1983) ("In general,
through [the amendment of] § 10(c) and related provisions, Congress sought to limit discretion exercised by the Board under the Wagner Act.") (footnote omitted), vacated and remanded, 464 U.S.
805 (1983); cf Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 657 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that Section 10(c) as originally enacted "did not pass the Wagner
Act Congress without objection to the uncontrolled breadth of [the Board's] power").
126. Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, and significantly amended the Act in 1947 and
again in 1959. See NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 500 (1960); NLRB v. A.P.W.
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Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA.' 27
As originally drafted by the House,' 28 the proviso would have prohibited the Board from awarding reinstatement or backpay to "any employee who had been suspended or discharged, unless the weight of evidence showed that the employee was not suspended or dischargedfor
cause."'t 29 Although the "weight of evidence" language was subsequently eliminated in conference committee,' 30 that revision was premised upon the fact that Section 10(c) already authorized the Board to act
only upon a preponderance of the evidence.131
The fact that the deleted language was deemed redundant 132 suggests that the proviso ultimately included in Section 10(c) is not substantively different "from the earlier House draft which included the specific

Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1963). The 1947 revisions are commonly referred to as
the Taft-Hartley amendments in honor of their principal sponsors, Senator Robert Taft and Congressman Fred Hartley. See NLRB v. Wiltse, 188 F.2d 917, 923 (6th Cir. 1951).
127. See Zurn Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The 'discharge for
cause' language was added to Section 10(c) by the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments."); PittsburghDes Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74, 83 (9th Cir. 1960) (noting that "the amendment to §
10(c)... that the Board shall not require the reinstatement of any employee who has been suspended or discharged for 'cause"' was "contained in the Taft-Hartley law"); Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 142, 172 (1969) ("The Taft-Hartley amendments added to Section
10(c), a proviso.., that an employee cannot be reinstated who was discharged 'for cause."').
128. The Taft-Hartley legislation originated in the House of Representatives. See Int'l Union of
United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 885, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting) rev'd 429 U.S. 507 (1977); see also Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, & Ornamental Iron
Workers Local No. 1I1 v. NLRB, 946 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The House originally
passed its own version of section 10(c), but the Senate amended it to its current form.") (footnote
omitted).
129. N.Y. Univ. Med Ctr., 702 F.2d at 295 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 510, at
55, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1135, 1161); see also Zurn Indus., 680 F.2d at 689
(discussing the "bill introduced by Congressman Hartley" that included "the 'weight of the evidence' language").
130. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d at 295 ("In reaching a compromise, the conference committee deleted the 'weight of the evidence' language but inserted the cause provision, reformulating
the standard in positive as opposed to negative terms."); Zurn Indus., 680 F.2d at 689 ("A joint conference drafted a compromise version of the bill, passed by both houses of Congress in June, 1947,
which deleted the 'weight of the evidence' language ... and cast the [cause] standard in affirmative
rather than negative terms ... ").
131. See N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d at 295 ("The conference agreement omits the 'weight
of evidence' language, since the Board, under the general provisions of section 10, must act on a
preponderance of evidence .. ") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 510, at 55, reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV. 1135, 1161). In particular, Section 10(c) directs the Board to award the relief authorized by that section, or dismiss the unfair labor practice complaint, based on "the preponderance of
the testimony" presented to it. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000).
132. Zurn Indus., 680 F.2d at 692 ("The... deletion of the phrase 'weight of the evidence' ...
served only to eliminate a redundancy with regard to the nature of the burden of proof .... ).
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'weight of the evidence' language." 133 If this interpretation of the legislative history is correct, 134 the proviso was clearly intended to preclude an
award of reinstatement or backpay only where the Board makes an evidentiary finding that the employee was suspended or discharged for
cause. 135 Moreover, in assessing that issue, the Board is undoubtedly entitled to prohibit the employer from relying on evidence of cause that has
remedial approach to
been "tainted by its own misconduct,"' 3 6 as 1the
37
Weingarten it adopted in Kraft effectively did.

133. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d at 295.
134. In some cases, resort to the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments has been
"unilluminating," Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danzinger, 709
F.2d 815, 838 n.5 (3d Cir. 1983), vacated & remandedsub nom. Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees
& Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491 (1984), and the legislative history of Section
10(c), in particular, has been described as "inconclusive." NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 904
n.8 (1st Cir. 1981); see also United Mine Workers, 92 N.L.R.B. 916, 925 (1950) (Reynolds, Member, dissenting in part and concurring specially) (describing an "inconsistency in the legislative history" of Section 10(c)).
135. See Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950):
In Section 10(c) the House bill provided that the Board should base its decisions upon
the 'weight of the evidence.' . .. The conference agreement provides that the Board shall
act only on the 'preponderance' of the testimony-that is to say, on the weight of the
credible evidence .... [T]he Board's decisions should show on their face that the statutory requirement has been met-they should indicate an actual weighing of the evidence,
setting forth the reasons for believing this evidence and disbelieving that, for according
greater weight to this testimony than to that, for drawing this inference rather than that.
Id. at 734 n. 1 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 510, at 53, reprintedin 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1135,

1159-60).
136. Craftool Mfg. Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 634, 638 (1977); see also Bath Iron Works Corp., 302
N.L.R.B. 898, 915 (1991) (holding that "tainted" evidence "may not be used to justify... discipline"). See generally Vernon Livestock Trucking Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1805, 1810 (1968) (asserting
that the Board is not "required to accept [the employer's] alleged lawful justification for a discharge
merely because it has been put forward with supporting evidence") (footnote omitted).
137. See 111.
Bell Tel. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 148, 150 (1985) ("In Kraft the Board [held] ...that a
wrongdoer could avoid the conventional reinstatement-backpay remedy... by showing that the
discipline which was meted out was not based on information obtained at the illegal interview but
was premised exclusively on data obtained independent of the interview."), enforced sub noma.
Communication Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1986); Gregory, supra note 22, at 619
n.336 ("[T]he Board's approach in Kraft... looked to the existence of evidence obtained independent of the unlawful interview.").
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MAKE-WHOLE RELIEF FOR WEINGARTEN VIOLATIONS

FURTHERS IMPORTANT POLICY OBJECTIVES

A. Make- Whole Relief Should be Available Where There is a Sufficient
"Nexus" Between the Employer's Weingarten Violation and
its DisciplinaryDecision
Despite the Board's contrary assertion,1 38 the Kraft approach to
remedying Weingarten violations may be preferable, as a matter of polreasons.14 0
icy, 139 to the one purportedly adopted in Taracorp for several
First, even the Taracorp Board appears to have recognized that there
may be some Weingarten cases in which there is a "sufficient nexus between the unfair labor practice committed (denial of representation at an
the discharge (perceived misinvestigatory interview) and the reason for 141
conduct) to justify a make-whole remedy."'
Such a nexus presumably can exist even though the employee "was
1 42
not disciplined for asserting his Weingarten rights at the interview,"
as Taracorp is generally deemed to require. 143 Indeed, the Board has
noted that the denial of union representation at an investigatory interview violates an employee's Section 7 rights "for the very reason
138. See Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 221-22 (1984) ("[M]ake-whole relief in the context of a Weingarten violation... constitutes bad policy."); see also Communication Workers, 784
F.2d at 848 (noting that the Board in Taracorp concluded that awarding make-whole relief for
Weingarten violations was "bad policy because the prospect of reinstatement had made the investigatory and remedial process in Weingarten cases too adversarial and complex").
139. The Board is vested with "primary responsibility and broad discretion to devise remedies
that effectuate the policies of the Act." Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898 (1984); see also
Rochester Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 896 F.2d 24, 28
(2d Cir. 1990) ("The primary responsibility for devising remedies that effectuate the policies of the
NLRA is vested in the Board .... ) (internal citations omitted).
140. As discussed infra notes 141-170 and accompanying text, Taracorp itself has been interpreted too narrowly to the extent it is often read to permit an award of make-whole relief in Weingarten cases "if, but only if, an employee is discharged or disciplined for asserting the right to representation." Circuit-Wise, Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 1091, 1109 (1992) (quoting Taracorp,273 N.L.R.B.
at 223 n.12).
141. Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. at 223; see also United States Postal Serv., 314 N.L.R.B. 227,
227 (1994) (citing Taracorp for the proposition that make-whole relief is unavailable where there is
"no demonstrated nexus between the wrongful denial of representation and the subsequent discipline").
142. Massillon Hosp. Ass'n, 282 N.L.R.B. 675, 677 (1987) (emphasis added) (applying Taracorp).
143. See, e.g., N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 42, 55 n.20 (1990) ("A make-whole remedy
can be appropriate in a Weingarten setting only if an employee is discharged for asserting the right
to representation.") (citing Taracorp,273 N.L.R.B. at 223).
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(among others) that if the employer had permitted a union representative
to participate in the ...

interview, the adverse personnel action which

the employer actually took after the interview might not have been taken
or might have been less severe. 14 4
For example, there is a "definite nexus" between an employer's
Weingarten violation and its subsequent disciplinary action where the
discipline resulted "from the employee's conduct during the unlawful
interview."'' 45 Such conduct by an unrepresented employee could include
a decision to "'dummy up' in the face of... attempts by his employer to
question him,"' 146 which-absent a right to reinstatement and other
make-whole relief under Weingarten' 47 -could result in his termination
or other disciplinary action. 48 In this situation, there presumably is a
sufficient nexus between the discipline imposed by the employer and its
denial of the employee's Weingarten rights to support an award of
144. United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 154 (1979); see also La. Council No. 17,
250 N.L.R.B. 880, 899-900 (1980) (noting that an award of make-whole relief to a Weingarten victim could be premised upon the assumption "that had the employee been granted his statutory right
to representation he would not have been disciplined").
145. Northwest Eng'g Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 190, 198 (1982); see also Westside Cmty. Mental
Health Ctr., 327 N.L.R.B. 661, 666 (1999) (describing an employee whose "termination was based,
in part, on ... actions she might not have taken if afforded the counsel of her union representative").
146. System 99, 289 N.L.R.B. 723, 727 (1988); see also Horwath & Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 805,
810 n.16 (1991) (discussing an employee who "decided ... to dummy-up; that is, to pretend to an
almost total lack of recollection as the best means of ensuring that he could not be blamed"); ITT
Lighting Fixtures, 261 N.L.R.B. 229, 231 n.11 (1982) (describing an employee who "refused to answer questions after his request for representation was denied").
147. In Glenside Hosp., 234 N.L.R.B. 62 (1978), a Board administrative law judge indicated
that absent the prospect of a make-whole remedy involving "restoration of the status quo ante," an
employer may "deliberately, well knowing the calculated risk, cause[] the discharge of an employee" and thereby "'profit from a stubborn refusal to abide by the law."' Id. at 70 (quoting Franks
Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944)). In this context, that result would run afoul of the Weingarten principle that "an employer cannot discipline an employee for refusing... to answer questions without union assistance." Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir.
1982); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 674 F.2d 576, 577 (6th Cir. 1982) ("The court's decision in Weingarten is abundantly clear that once ... a request [for union representation] is made, the
employee has the absolute right to refuse to answer any further questions until he receives the representation desired.").
148. See, e.g., Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 57, 58 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing an employee who was disciplined for insubordination after he "refused to answer the personnel
manager's inquiries without the presence of a union representative"); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 253
N.L.R.B. 1143, 1145 (1981) (describing an employer that "denied [an employee's] request for union
representation at an interview" and then "suspended [the employee] because [he] refused to answer
any questions at the interview without the union representation which he had requested"); Kraft
Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 599 (1980) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part) ("[Ihf the employee
said nothing at the interview ... the severity of the discipline imposed may be affected by the employee's demeanor or his 'refusal to cooperate' without representation."), overruled by Taracorp
Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222-23 (1984).
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make-whole relief. 149
A similar nexus may exist where an employee whose Weingarten
rights have been violated elects not to remain silent, 50 but provides inaccurate or misleading information to the employer during the unlawful
investigatory interview. 51Under these additional circumstances, any ensuing discipline 152 may be causally related to the Weingarten violation, 153 because "the central function of a Weingarten representative, as
the Supreme Court has observed, is to clarify information and to provide
assistance to an employee who
may be 'too fearful or inarticulate' to re54
information."'
accurate
late
149. See, e.g., Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 538, 541 (2001) (noting the "direct
correlation between the [employer's] action and [the employee's] assertion of her rights" where the
employee was terminated for refusing to answer questions at an unlawful investigatory interview);
Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 262 N.L.R.B. 970, 975 (1982) (finding that an employee was
"entitled to a make-whole remedy" where the employer "conducted an unlawful interview with [the
employee] and subsequently discharged [him], at least in part, for his refusal to answer questions at
that unlawful interview"); cf Safeway Stores, Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. 989, 989-90 (1991) (stating that
"[t]he nexus between the statutory right and the discharge is clear" where the employee is terminated for "refus[ing] to participate in an investigatory interview.. . without the assistance of a union steward").
150. See, e.g., Ohio Masonic Home, 251 N.L.R.B. 606, 607 (1980) ("The employee asked that
another employee be allowed to accompany her as her representative but the [e]mployer refused and
the interview proceeded without the employee representative."); Exxon Co. U.S.A., 223 N.L.R.B.
203, 205 (1976) (describing an employee who "agreed to be interviewed" after "requesting and being denied union representation").
151. See United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 156 (1979) ("Denial of Weingarten
rights during an investigatory interview ....may render the .evidence adduced during the interview
inaccurate or incomplete."); Thrifty Drug Stores Co. v. Warehouse, Processing and Distribution
Workers' Union, 50 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1253, 1260 (1968) (Jones, Arb.) (indicating that fear of
the consequences of the employer's investigation may have "prompted falsification" by employees
who were denied union representation at their investigatory interviews).
152. See, e.g., Turner v. Holbrook, 278 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2002) (describing an employee
who was "terminated ...for providing false information in an official investigation"); Schafer Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers Int'l Union Local 326, 95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 759, 762 (1990)
(Brown, Arb.) (quoting a company work rule stating that "giving false information during an investigation is cause for disciplinary action, and may be cause for immediate discharge").
153. See, e.g., Kraft, 251 N.L.R.B. at 599 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part) ("[T]he employee [who] chooses to deny all accusations although some of them were true... might not have
made this choice, and so further antagonized the employer, had he been allowed the representation
he requested and unlawfully was denied."); Ohio Masonic Home, 251 N.L.R.B. at 607, 610 (finding
that the presence of a union representative "might have affected the outcome of [an] interview" in
which the employee "did not [provide] a satisfactory explanation in response to the complaints"
against her); cf L.A. Water Treatment, 263 N.L.R.B. 244, 249 (1982) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting
in part) (asserting that the discipline of an employee whose Weingarten rights have been violated is
"based on information which, as a result of the denial of representation,is in all likelihood incomplete or inaccurate") (emphasis added).
154. L.A. Water Treatment, 263 N.L.R.B. at 249 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part) (quoting
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 263-64 (1975)); see also United States Postal Serv. v.
NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the ability of an informed union represen-
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In this regard, several labor arbitrators have asserted that evidence
elicited in interrogations that occur without a union representative present may be inherently unreliable, 15 5 and should be "regarded with skepticism and given weight only when other evidence corroborates their
substance."' 156 There is also Board authority noting that "the employer
who denies representation to an employee during an interview creates
circumstances which are conducive to the production of inaccurate and
incomplete
information concerning the events which prompted the inter57
view."'

In particular, the failure to provide an employee with union representation deprives the employee of assistance in responding to the employer's charges. 158 In upholding the Board's extension of Weingarten to
encompass a right to confer with a union representative before an investigatory interview,1 59 for example, one court emphasized the representative's role in "bringing to light justifications, explanations, extenuating
circumstances, and other mitigating factors."' 160 As the Board itself has
tative "to aid in a full and cogent presentation of the employee's view of the matter").
155. See Maurey Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 714, 95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 148,
155 (1990) (Goldstein, Arb.) (noting that "lack of Union representation, especially if a Weingarten
violation is found," is a factor arbitrators use "to test [the] reliability and validity of employee statements"); cf Thrifty Drug Stores, 50 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1258 ("If [the employer's] factfinding procedures were significantly flawed, then the 'facts' which they produced must be discounted as unreliable .... ").
156. Rohr Indus. Inc. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Dist. Lodge 964, 93
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 145, 157 (1989) (Goulet, Arb.) (quoting Thrifty Drug Stores, 50 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) at 1262); cf Martin v. Consol. Freightways, No. 84-5966, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14122, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 1985) (discussing the contention that the denial of union representation in an investigatory interview should have 'some effect on the weight that would be given to
the statements supposedly given by the [employee]').
157. L.A. Water Treatment, 263 N.L.R.B. at 249 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part); see
also Montgomery Ward & Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 826, 832 (1981) (noting that "coercion that caused
[employees] to proceed with their ... interviews without their requested union representatives could
well have tainted the validity of their... statements"), enforced in part and enforcement denied in
part,664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1981).
158. See United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431, 446 (1990)
("[D]enying an employee who is the subject of an examination.., representation rights... deprives
the employee of assistance in articulating any available defense and thereby diminishes the possibility of avoiding an unjustified disciplinary action."); see also NLRB v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
730 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Put simply, the union representative is there to help the employee in his effort to vindicate himself.").
159. See Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1189-90 (1977), enforcement denied,
584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978); see also System 99, 289 N.L.R.B. 723, 727 (1988) ("[lit is now settled that an employee has the right to consult with an employee representative before undergoing an
interview when Weingarten protections apply.").
160. United States Postal Serv. v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing a union representative's ability "to clarify facts, or to bring additional relevant facts to [the employer's] atten-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 9
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 21:2

repeatedly noted, 61 depriving an employee of such assistance may be a
contributing factor in the employee's discharge, 62 and
should perhaps
63

give rise to a presumptive right to make-whole relief.1

Indeed, the Board in Taracorp itself acknowledged that an employee is entitled to make-whole relief if the employee was "discharged

or disciplined for what appears to be a legitimate reason, but further examination reveals that the discharge or discipline was the result of an act
' 64
that was.., an unfair labor practice."'
An employee who would not
have been disciplined (or disciplined as severely) if the employer had
complied with Weingarten'65 clearly has been disciplined as the result of

tion").
161. See Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 1007, 1019 (1979) ("In several cases, briefed to
courts of appeals, the Board has argued that [an] employer's refusal to permit union representation
during 'interviews' arguably prevented discussions during which representatives of concerned
workers could have raised extenuating circumstances, which might have convinced the [employer]
involved not to impose discipline.").
162. See, e.g., Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. at 446 ("[B]ecause the employee's union representative was denied the ability to assist the employee in presenting a defense to the charges being
investigated, the employee may have suffered an unjustified disciplinary action."); see also Cont'lIndianapolis, Inc. v. Local 135, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 409, 416 (1982)
(House, Arb.) (describing an employer that denied its employee's request for union representation
and then "misled [him] into a false sense of security and, as a consequence, secured from him a confession that he had stolen... Company merchandise"); Thrifty Drug Stores v. Warehouse, Processing and Distribution Workers Union, 50 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1253, 1260 (1960) (Jones, Arb.)
(finding evidence to support the conclusion that employees denied union representation were
"gulled into a false sense of reliance so that fabricated disclosures would appear to them as a desirable way to save their jobs").
163. See System 99, 289 N.L.R.B. at 728 (noting that Kraft held make-whole relief to be "presumptively appropriate" if the employer "'conducted an investigatory interview in violation of
Weingarten and ... the employee whose rights were violated was subsequently disciplined for the
conduct which was the subject of the unlawful interview') (quoting Kraft Foods, Inc., 251
N.L.R.B. 598, 598 (1980), overruledby Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222-23 (1984)); Gold
Kist Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 66, 70 (1987) (Byars,
Arb.) (indicating that make-whole relief is appropriate "if there is a possibility, regardless of how
remote, that the [employee] was prejudiced" by the denial of union representation).
164. Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. at 222 (emphasis added) (citing Fibreboard Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)); see also United Rubber Workers of Am., Local 250, 279 N.L.R.B.
1074, 1076 n.4 (1986) (Dennis, Member, dissenting in part), overruled by Iron Workers Local Union 377, 326 N.L.R.B. 375 ("Taracorp recognized that a make-whole remedy is appropriate.., if
the discharge, though apparently for a legitimate reason, is the result of an act that was an unfair
labor practice .... ).
165. The right to union representation under Weingarten is based in part upon the assumption
that a union representative who participates in an investigatory interview "may be able, through informal discussion and persuasion conducted at the threshold, to serve as the catalyst in the amicable
resolution of disputes." E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061, 1065 (3d Cir.
1983), vacatedon other grounds, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
227 N.L.R.B. 1223, 1224 (1977) ("[U]nion stewards all over the nation adjust thousands of grievances every day in an informal, expeditious, and satisfactory manner.").
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an "act"--the denial of union representation-that is an unfair labor
practice. 166
In short, when an employee's discipline was based solely or even
primarily upon "information obtained at an unlawful interview,"' 67 or
upon "the employee's conduct during the unlawful interview, ' 6 there is
at least arguably a sufficient nexus between the employer's denial of the
employee's right to union representation and its disciplinary decision to
warrant the award of make-whole relief even under the reasoning of Taracorp.169 As one commentator has explained:
[W]hen an employer inflicts discipline putatively in response to an
employee's underlying misconduct, and a Weingarten violation takes
place, if the employer disciplines the employee on the basis of information elicited during the course of the violative interview, one could
argue that
the cause-in-fact for the discipline was the Weingarten vio170
lation.

166. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1982) ("It is clear
that investigatory confrontation without requested union representation is an unfair labor practice .... "); Orozco v. County of Monterey, 941 F. Supp. 930, 939 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that
the "denial of a [sic] employee's request that a union representative be present at an investigatory
interview constitutes an unfair labor practice").
167. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 262 N.L.R.B. 970, 971 (1982) (Jenkins, Member,
concurring).
168. Northwest Eng'g Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 190, 198 (1982).
169. See Bath Iron Works Corp., 302 N.L.R.B. 898, 915 (1991) (noting that "make-whole
remedies including reinstatement and backpay are appropriate" under Taracorp where the "'loss of
employment stems directly from an unfair labor practice') (quoting Taracorp, 273 N.L.R.B. at
222); Redway Carriers, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 1359, 1359 n.4 (1985) (stating that Taracorp"held that a
make-whole remedy is appropriate to remedy a discharge ... in those instances [in which] the loss
of employment stems directly from the conduct that is the unfair labor practice"); cf Page Litho,
Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 960 (1994):
The Board held in Taracorp that the employer's violation of an employee's Weingarten
rights did not automatically entitle the employee to reinstatement where there was not a
sufficient nexus between the unfair labor practice-denial of [union] representation at an
investigatory interview-and the reason for the employee's discharge-perceived misconduct.
Id. at 962 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
170. Steven J. Silverman, Comment, The Differing Nature of the Weingarten Right to Union
Representation in the NLRB andArbitral Forums, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 467, 478-79 n.55 (1989). A
Board administrative law judge has similarly noted that the conclusion that an employee's discharge
resulted from the employer's Weingarten violation may be "based on ... a legal construct derived
from the facts that he was denied his right to union representation and was discharged." Louisiana
Council No. 17, 250 N.L.R.B. 880, 900 (1980); see also NLRB v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel., 676 F.2d 499,
502 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1982) (reserving judgment on the question of whether "the revelation by the employee of incriminating information not [previously] known to the employer" in an interview in
which union representation was denied "would support the inference that the disciplinary decision
was based in part on the assertion of the Weingarten right or on the interview").
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B, The PrevailingInterpretationof Taracorp Discouragesthe Use of
Board Proceduresfor Remedying Weingarten Violations

1. Employees Can Still Obtain Make-Whole Relief for Weingarten
Violations in Arbitration Proceedings
An additional policy argument for returning to the Kraft approach
to remedying Weingarten violations arises from the ability of employees
to circumvent the remedial limitations established in Taracorpby asserting their Weingarten claims in arbitration proceedings, 171 rather than in
Board unfair labor practice proceedings. 172 In particular, labor arbitrators, who generally regard the right to union representation at an investigatory interview as "an implied right of procedural 'just cause' in management's disciplinary process,"' 173 do not appear to view Section 10(c)
of the NLRA as an
impediment to the award of make-whole relief in
174
Weingarten cases.

In Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. InternationalBrotherhood of

171. Because "alleged Weingarten violations involve basic due process rights," they "may
properly be considered in arbitration." Anchorage Hilton Hotel v. Hotel Employees, Local 878, 102
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 55, 58 (1993) (Landau, Arb.). But see Coca-Cola Bottling Group v. Gen.
Truck Drivers Local 952, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 343, 349 (1991) (Weckstein, Arb.) ("Not all
arbitrators agree that so-called Weingarten rights apply in arbitrations.").
172. However, one arbitrator has observed that "the National Labor Relations Board is the
primary custodian of the Weingarten doctrine." Simkins Indus., Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l
Union, Local 214, 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 551, 557 (1996) (Fullmer, Arb.). Thus, unless the
Board acquiesces, arbitrators may be "without authority to interpret [that decision] and the precedent thereunder." Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers Local 684,
105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 529, 533 (1995) (Hockenberry, Arb.). See generally Ryan Aeronautical
Co. v. UAW, Local 506, 179 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D. Cal. 1959) ("[A] submission to arbitration would
not and could not oust the National Labor Relations Board of jurisdiction to consider the unfair labor practice dispute involved if the Board has not ceded jurisdiction.").
173. Maui Pineapple Co. v. ILWU, Local 142, 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 907, 910 (1986)
(Tsukiyama, Arb.); see also Anchorage Hilton Hotel, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 58 ("Alleged
due process violations, including alleged Weingarten violations, are simply part of the inquiry into
whether the employer conducted a fair investigation under the 'seven tests of just cause."') (citing
ADOLPH M. KOVEN & SUSAN L. SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS 179-216 (2d ed. 1992)).

174. Section 10(c) merely "prevents the Board from providing a [make-whole] remedy for an
employee's discharge if that discharge was for cause." Cirker's Moving & Storage Co., 313
N.L.R.B. 1318, 1318 n. I (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, labor arbitrators, unlike the Board, appear
to "have the authority to reinstate employees terminated for cause." United States Dep't of Justice,
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 48 F.L.R.A. 908, 912 (1993); see also Maui Pineapple Co., 86 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) at 910 (awarding backpay to an employee who "was denied his 'Weingarten right' to
union representation during [the] Employer's investigative interrogation" even though he was
"found to have committed a dischargeable offense").
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Boilermakers, 75 for example, an arbitrator relied on Weingarten176 in
holding that an employee's termination "was not supported by just cause
because [he] was denied Union representation during a meeting in which
he was questioned regarding alleged misconduct."' 177 Because the employer failed to comply with Weingarten,178 the arbitrator refused to consider whether the employee's termination was otherwise justified, 17 9 and
him whole for
ordered the employer to reinstate the employee and make
80
any losses he incurred as the result of his termination.,
Combustion Engineering predated the Board's decision in Kraft,' 81
when the Board itself also ordered employers "to reinstate, with backpay, employees fired after interviews from which union representatives
had been excluded."' 8 2 In Tokheim Corp.,183 for example, a Board administrative law judge noted that pre-Kraft Board law 184 authorized an
award of make-whole relief even when the denial of an employee's request for union representation "had no influence at all on her discharge
175. 67 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 349 (1976) (Clarke, Arb.).
176. See generally City of Edina v. Int'l Assoc. of Fire Fighters, Local 1275, 90 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 209, 211 (1987) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.) ("[Tihe vast majority of arbitrators.., have concluded
that Weingarten provides guidance ... even where ... a right [to union representation] is not explic-

itly provided in the [collective bargaining] agreement.").
177. Combustion Eng'g,67 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 350.
178. See id. at 351 (citing Weingarten in discussing the "defect in the discharge caused by the
Company's failure to allow Union representation").
179. See id. at 352 ("In view of the nature of the defect in the procedure used by the Company
to discharge the Grievant, the Arbitrator will not inquire into the alleged misconduct of the Grievant
to determine if some penalty should be imposed.").
180. See id.; cf Anaconda Co. v. Dist. Lodge No. 27, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 693 F.2d 35,
36 (6th Cir. 1982) (describing an arbitrator who "did not reach the issue of whether [an employee's]
discharge was for just cause but rather ordered [his] reinstatement because of the lack of union representation").
181. Labor arbitrators' recognition of a right to union representation at an investigatory interview, and the corresponding need to remedy violations of that right, predated Weingarten, let alone
Kraft. See 11.Bell Tel. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, 63 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 968, 978
(1974) (Dolnick, Arb.) (referring to pre-Weingarten arbitration decisions that "have generally held
that an employee is entitled to Union representation where the interrogation is related to a prospective discipline or when the employee has reasonable grounds to expect to be disciplined");
Silverman, supra note 170, at 469 ("Industrial arbitrators had long recognized the right to union
representation at investigatory interviews before the Supreme Court handed down its Weingarten
decision.").
182. Communication Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 848 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Certified
Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1979)); see also Dobranski, supra note 67, at 324 (noting that prior to its decision in Kraft, the
Board's practice was to award make-whole relief "whenever an employee was discharged after being denied his Weingartenrights").
183. 265 N.L.R.B. 1658 (1982).
184. Although the Board's own decision in Tokheim post-dated Kraft, the administrative law
judge's decision was issued in August 1979, a year before Kraft was decided. See id. at 1658.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

27

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 9
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

for cause."

[Vol. 21:2

185

In cases decided subsequent to Kraft, both arbitrators and the Board
retreated from this categorical view,' 86 holding that a Weingarten violation ordinarily "must prejudice the employee before the disciplinary action should be overturned."' 187 In Marquette Inn v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 88 for example, an arbitrator denied the grievance of an employee who was not afforded union representation at a "disciplinary
meeting,"' 89 because the employee did not make any self-incriminating
admissions during the meeting, and his discharge was based entirely on
evidence obtained from others. 190 However, the arbitrator indicated that
he would have overturned the discharge if evidence obtained during the
meeting had played any significant role in the employer's termination
of proof' would then have
decision,' 9' because the "substantive body
92
been "tainted by the procedural defect.'
A similar result was reached in Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United Steel Workers, 193 where several employees implicated in illegal drug activity were interviewed without the assistance of a
union representative.' 94 During their interviews, each of the employees
admitted their use, sale, or possession of illegal drugs on the employer's
185. Id. at 1662 n.4 (citing Certified Grocers, 227 N.L.R.B. at 1215, and Anchortank, Inc., 239
N.L.R.B. 430, 431 n.9 (1978), enforcement denied in part, 618 F2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also
Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 91, 96 n.17 (1980) (noting that the Board in Anchortank ordered an employer "to reinstate an employee, with back pay, for violation of his Weingarten rights
even though the Board recognized that, apart from the Weingartenviolation, the discharge was lawful").
186. Kraft itself was a departure from the Board's "longstanding practice of ordering a 'make
whole' remedy whenever it has been established that an employer has disciplined an employee for
conduct which was [the] subject of an interview conducted in violation of Weingarten." Kraft
Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 599 (1980) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part), overruled by Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222-23 (1984).
187. Bi-State Dev. Agency v. Amalgamated Transit Div. 788, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 319,
324 (1995) (Bailey, Arb.); see also Anchorage Hilton Hotel v. Hotel Employees, Local 878, 102
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 55, 58 (1993) (Landau, Arb.) ("Absent a showing of prejudice, it is not appropriate to overturn the disciplinary action against [a] grievant [whose Weingarten rights have been
violated].").
188. 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1259 (1982) (Flagler, Arb.).
189. Id. at 1264. The Board has indicated that "the full purview of protections accorded employees under Weingarten apply to both 'investigatory' and 'disciplinary' interviews, save only
those conducted for the exclusive purpose of notifying an employee of previously determined disciplinary action." Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 995, 997 (1979).
190. See MarquetteInn, 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1264.
191. See id. ("If the self-incriminating evidence of the accused were the primary or even a significant element in support of the charge, I would have no choice but to vacate the discharge.").
192. Id.
193. 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 921 (1982) (Garrett, Arb.).
194. Id. at 921-22.
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premises. 195 When the employees were subsequently discharged, the unchallenging the validity of the
ion brought grievances on their behalf
96
decisions.1
disciplinary
employer's
The union argued that the employer had violated the employees'
statutory and contractual rights to union representation 97 and thus was
prohibited from relying on evidence that originated in its investigatory
interviews.1 98 The union also argued that all of the employer's evidence
originated in the unlawful interviews, and that, under Kraft, the discharges should therefore be set aside and the employees reinstated with
'
backpay. 99
The employer responded to the union's argument by noting that the
Board in Kraft had refused to overturn a discharge despite the denial of
union representation because the discharge "was based on evidence obtained independently from the improper interview., 200 Because most of
the employees admitted in their testimony at the arbitration hearing that
they were involved in illegal drug activity, 20 1 the employer asserted that
its failure to provide them with union representation during their prior
investigatory interviews should not invalidate their discharges.20 2
The arbitrator agreed that the Board's analysis in Kraft was instruc2
tive, 3 and concluded that the remedy for a Weingarten violation should
be sufficient to deter future violations,2° while nevertheless providing
195. Id. at 922.
196. Id. at 921-22.
197. Id. at 923-24; cf Coca-Cola Bottling Group v. Gen. Truck Drivers Local 952, 97 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 343, 349 (1991) (Weckstein, Arb.) ("A failure to provide union representation to
an employee, upon request, at an investigative meeting that might lead to discipline can be an unfair
labor practice . . ., but it is not necessarily a breach of the contractual rights owed to an employee ....
").
198. See Newport News, 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 923 ("Having failed to offer [union] representation, [the union] says, the Company cannot now rely on any admissions by the grievants
which originated in such meetings.").
199. Id.at 924.
200. Id.at 925.
201. Id. at 922, 928 ("With a single exception,.., none of the grievants denied having engaged
but one of the... grievants consistently
in [the] conduct during testimony at the hearing ....[A]II
and freely have admitted engaging in [the illicit] conduct.., all the way through the hearing.").
202. See id. at 927.
203. See id. at 928 (looking to Kraft for guidance in a "somewhat comparable situation[] under
Weingarten").
204. See id. at 927 ("[I]t reasonably may be inferred that revocation of the discipline normally
would follow where such action properly may be regarded as essential to assure full compliance
");
cf Ind. Convention Ctr. v. Plumbers &
with the [obligation to provide union representation] ....
Steamfitters Union, Local 400, 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 713, 721 (1992) (Wolff, Arb.) (concluding
that "a substantial remedy must be afforded so that in the future the Employer will not breach this
particular [right]").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 9
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 21:2

the employer with an opportunity to produce independent evidence of an
employee's misconduct. 2 5 The arbitrator characterized the employees'
admissions of illicit activity as the "dominant fact" in the case,20 6 and
concluded that those admissions required that their discharges be upheld
20 7
despite the employer's violation of their right to union representation.
This remedial approach to Weingarten violations, like the Board's
approach in Kraft,2 °8 essentially applies an exclusionary rule to evidence
obtained in an unlawful investigatory interview. 20 9 Moreover, the arbitral
approach to Weingarten does not appear to have been altered by the
Board's overruling of Kraft in Taracorp.210 In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
United Paperworkers International Union,2 t' for example, Kraft was
2 12 for the
cited with apparent approval in a case decided after Taracorp
proposition that an employee denied union representation during an investigatory interview "is not entitled to a make-whole remedy ifthe
[c]ompany's decision to discipline
was not based on information ob213
interview.
that
during
tained
205. See Newport News, 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 928.
206. Id. The arbitrator acknowledged that one of the employees had "disavowed the statements
attributed to him in his .,. interview" when he subsequently testified at the arbitration hearing, and
that his situation therefore required "additional comment." Id. However, the arbitrator concluded
that the employee's failure to disavow his admission until shortly before the arbitration hearing deprived the employer of "any opportunity to produce its additional independent evidence" of the employee's misconduct, and that the disavowal therefore did not provide a basis for invalidating his
termination. Id.
207. See id However, the arbitrator emphasized that the employees' admissions made the case
"unique," and stated that his decision therefore "in no way constitute[d] a precedent in future situations where the facts may differ." Id.
208. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
209. See Toledo Bd. of Educ. v. Toledo Assoc. of Admin. Pers., 117 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
1409, 1413 (October 16, 2002) (Frankiewicz, Arb.) (observing that the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of an employee's Weingarten rights "is analogous to the criminal law rule excluding the confession of a defendant who was not informed of his right to silence"); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 243, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 321, 325 & n.8 (1983)
(Dobry, Arb.) (characterizing a prohibition on the use of evidence obtained during an interview in
which an employee was denied union representation as a "bastardized version of the... exclusionary rule" applicable in cases involving "confessions garnered in violation of Miranda").
210. In addition, one state counterpart to the NLRB, the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board,
recently declined to follow Taracorp, and instead held that "the proper remedy [for a Weingarten
violation] is a make-whole order consistent with the [Board's] decision ...in Kraft." Commonwealth v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 768 A.2d 1201, 1206 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). But see AFG Indus. v. Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers, Local 456, 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 568, 572 (1986)
(Clarke, Arb.) ("In applying the National Labor Relations Act the Arbitrator must, of course, be
bound by decisions of the National Labor Relations Board . .
211. 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 554 (1996) (Byars, Arb.).
212. See id. at 558 n.6.
213. Id. at 558 (emphasis added). But cf Longmont Turkey Processors, Inc. v. United Food &
Commercial Workers, Local 7, 84 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 638, 641 (1985) (Cohen, Arb.) (finding it
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In another post-Taracorp arbitration decision, Briggs & Stratton
Corp. v. United Paperworkers International Union, Local 7232214 an

employee suspected of participating in drug-related criminal activity was
denied union representation during a police investigation conducted on

the employer's premises.2

5

After reviewing a copy of the police re-

2 6

port, ' which described a significant admission obtained from the em218
217
the employer discharged the employee.
ployee during his interview,
Without specifically discussing Kraft, Taracorp, or even Weingarten itself,219 the arbitrator concluded that the employer was precluded from
disciplining the employee based on evidence obtained by the police because the employee had not been afforded union representation during
his interview.220

In summary, labor arbitrators, who bear the primary responsibility
for determining whether employees have been disciplined for cause,21
generally continue to follow Kraft and, at least where employees have

been prejudiced by a denial of union representation, 222 "grant substantive

unnecessary to address an employer's contention that "reinstatement... is not the penalty for violation of the Weingarten rights of an employee") (emphasis added).
214. 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1023 (1997) (Briggs, Arb.).
215. See id. at 1024. Although the employee inquired about his right to have a union representative present, Id. at 1027, neither the union nor the employer was permitted to participate in, or
even observe, the police interview. See id at 1026, 1029.
216. See id. at 1024.
217. See id. at 1026 (describing a reference in the police report to the employee's alleged
statement that he was "not going to deny being involved with [drug] dealing").
218. See id.
at 1024.
219. Because the employee in Briggs & Stratton Corp. invoked a contractual right to union
representation, the arbitrator analyzed a prior arbitration decision construing the pertinent contract
provision, and did not specifically discuss Weingarten or any Board cases interpreting the statutory
right to representation. See id.at 1027 & n.5, 1030 n.7. See generally Pan Am. Airways Corp. v. Air
Line Pilots Ass'n, 206 F. Supp. 2d 12, 22 (D.D.C. 2002) ("Arbitrators often look to related arbitration decisions in an effort to construe similar provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.").
220. See Briggs & Stratton Corp., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1030. The arbitrator nevertheless upheld the employer's disciplinary decision because the evidence the employer had obtained
independently provided it with "just and sufficient cause to discharge the [employee]." Id.
221. See I11.
Bell Tel. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 148, 152 (1985), enforced sub noma.
Communication
Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1986):
[T]he Board... [is] in the unaccustomed position of determining whether there was just
cause for [a] discharge and whether there was lawful and probative evidence to support a
finding of just cause. This is normally the role of the arbitrator in applying the grievance
provisions of a contract. The Board does not usually sit in judgment on the expediency,
wisdom, or necessity of employee terminations.
222. See Trailways, Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 88 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 941, 947
(1987) (Heinsz, Arb.) ("Arbitrators have refused to sustain terminations where management has
denied employees the right to have present a Union steward when such... could have influenced
the outcome of the event.").
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remedies to employees whose Weingarten right has been violated,
whereas the NLRB does not., 223 The prevailing arbitral approach can be
summarized in the following terms: "An employer's failure to comply
with procedural requirements does not always result in the arbitrator refusing to uphold the discipline or discharge. However, if there is a possibility, regardless of how remote, that the grievant was prejudiced by the
employer's omission, the employer's action should be set aside. 224
2. Both The Board and the FLRA are Likely to Defer to Arbitrators'
Awards of Make-Whole Relief for Weingarten Violations

a. The Board's Policy of Deferring to Arbitration
The practical policy implications of the arbitral approach to Weingarten are apparent when the approach is considered in conjunction with
the Board's "decades-old policy of deferral to arbitration awards resolving unfair labor practice charges., 22 5 This policy has been summarized in
the following terms:
In recognition of both the fact that it has authority to interpret collective bargaining agreements only in connection with unfair labor practice charges, and the importance of the principle of freedom of contract
in labor law, the Board has long had a policy of deferring to arbitration
when a contract provides for that means of dispute resolution. Under
[this] policy.., when the parties to a dispute have provided for arbitration, the Board will not begin an unfair labor practice proceeding
until arbitration has run its course. Under a closely related policy, the
Board also defers to the results of arbitration, so long as those results
criteria designed to insure fairness and consismeet certain general 226
tency with the NLRA.

223. Silverman, supra note 170, at 482 & n.79 (citing Taracorp, Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221
(1984)); see also Marion Gen. Hosp. v. Local No. 4371, Communications Workers, 90 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 735, 738 (1988) (Curry, Jr., Arb.) ("[The union] argues that under the Weingarten doctrine the Grievant was denied due process and that arbitrators have often disaffirmed or modified the
discipline issued by the employer in such cases.").
224. Gold Kist Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 66, 70
(1987) (Byars, Arb.); see also Bake Rite Rolls v. Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers Int'l
Union, 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1133, 1136-37 (1988) (DiLauro, Arb.) (quoting and applying
GoldKist, 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 70).
225. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Martin, 983 F.2d 1195, 1200 (2d Cir. 1993).
226. NLRB v. United States Postal Serv., 8 F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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As this summary suggests, the Board actually has two distinct, but
closely related, deferral policies.2 2 7 Its "post-arbitral" deferral policy was
first established in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,228 and later refined in

other Board cases. 22 9 Under the Spielberg doctrine, the Board grants deference to an arbitration award where the arbitration proceedings appear
to have been fair and regular, all parties agreed to be bound, the arbitrator's decision is not "clearly repugnant" to the purposes and policies of
the NLRA, 230 and the arbitrator considered the unfair labor practice issue.231 According to the Board, "an arbitrator has adequately considered
the unfair labor practice if (1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to
the unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice. 2 32
The burden is on the party opposing deferral to affirmatively demonstrate the defects in the arbitral process or award.23 3
Under the Board's "pre-arbitral" deferral policy, which is an outgrowth of the Spielberg doctrine,23 4 the Board defers its consideration of
unfair labor practice charges pending the exhaustion of any applicable
grievance and arbitration procedures. 235 In Collyer Insulated Wire, 2 36 the
227. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (referring to "the
Board's two 'deferral' policies").
228. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
229. See Hammontree, 925 N.L.R.B. at 1491 (noting that the deferral policy established in
Spielberg "has undergone several subsequent revisions"); Ad-Art, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 590, 606
(1988) (finding that in Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984), the Board "clarified its Spielberg standards"). See generally NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 380 n.4 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Garth, J., concurring) ("The Board appears to change its policies on deference with some regular-

ity.").
230.

An award is "clearly repugnant" to the Act only if it is "palpably wrong." See Olin Corp.,

268 N.L.R.B. at 574 ("[W]ith regard to the inquiry into the 'clearly repugnant' standard, we would
not require an arbitrator's award to be totally consistent with Board precedent. Unless the award is
'palpably wrong,' i.e., unless the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act, we will defer.") (footnote omitted); Inland Steel Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 1091, 1091
(1982) ("The test of repugnancy under Spielberg is not whether the Board would have reached the
same result as an arbitrator, but whether the arbitrator's award is palpably wrong as a matter of
law.").
231. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082; Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884-85
(1963), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964).
232. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
233. See id.
234. See Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744, 746 n.l (D.C.

Cir. 1992) (noting that the Board's pre-arbitral deferral policy is"an outgrowth of the older Spielberg policy"). But see Pincus Bros., 620 F.2d at 373 n. 12 ("There is some debate as to whether [the
Board's pre-arbitral deferral policy] evolved from Spielberg or whether it was a new, and broader,
doctrine.").
235. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1485, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Under [its pre-arbitral
deferral policy], the Board refers [unfair labor practice] complaints filed by the General Counsel to
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Board held that it will defer to the arbitration process where (1) there is a
long and productive collective bargaining relationship between the parties, (2) there is no enmity by the employer toward the employee's exercise of protected rights, (3) the employer indicates a willingness to arbitrate, (4) the collective bargaining agreement provides for the arbitration
of a broad range of disputes, including the dispute at issue, and (5) the
contract and its meaning lie at the center of the dispute such that the dispute is "eminently well suited" to resolution by arbitration. 23 7 When a
case is deferred prior to arbitration, the Board retains jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitrator's ultimate award actually satisfies its requirements for post-arbitral deferral under Spielberg.2 38
b. Board Deferral to Arbitration in the Weingarten Context
In Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc.,239 the Board was faced with the
question of whether to defer to an arbitrator's decision addressing the
denial of two employees' right to union representation during telephone
interviews. 240 The employees, who were terminated after they refused to
answer the employer's questions during the interviews,24 1 were provided
with union representation during personal interviews conducted both before and after their telephone interviews.24 2
The arbitrator held that the employer violated the employees' contractual right to union representation 243 and, in all likelihood, their statutory right to such representation under Weingarten as well.244 However,
arbitration procedures established in the governing [collective bargaining agreement]; in doing so,
the Board defers or delays its consideration of the complaint.").
236.

192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).

237. Id. at 841-42; see also United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1984) (reaffirming
the Collyer doctrine).
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See
242
See
See
See

Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 843; United Techs., 268 N.L.R.B. at 560.
N.L.R.B. 1169 (1979).
id. at 1169.
id.
id.at 1169, 1176.

243. See Pac. Southwest Airline v. Airline, Aerospace & Employees Teamsters, Local 2707, 70
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 205, 215 (1977) (Jones, Jr., Arb.). Arbitrators have occasionally noted that a
collective bargaining agreement may grant employees "broader rights to representation" than those
available to them under Weingarten. Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Local 1186,
101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 634, 638 (1993) (Ross, Arb.); see also Heinz, USA, v. United Food &
Commercial Workers, Local 325, 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 500, 502 (1999) (Grupp, Arb.) (dis-

cussing "contractual language ...[that] exceeds the requirements of the Weingarten line of cases").
244.

See Pac. Southwest Airline, 70 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 215. Obviously, both "contrac-

tual and statutory rights... [may be] violated as a result of the same factual occurrence." Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol21/iss2/9

34

Moberly and Lisenbee: Honing Our Kraft?: Reconciling Variations in the Remedial Treatme
2004]

Honing Our Kraft?

he refused to hold that the denial of union representation invalidated the
employer's disciplinary decision in its entirety245 because he found that
the violation was "not material. 2 46 In ordering the employees reinstated
without backpay, 247 thus effectively converting their discharges to disciplinary suspensions,24 8 the arbitrator explained:
[I1n this.., telephone situation, all that the two employees did was to
repeat their insistence [sic]-mistakenly--on a right not to respond
which they had formulated and persisted in the day before while given
not only the presence of Union representation but also periodic opportunities to bolster that representation by telephone calls to the Union.
So, although the failure of the [employer] to allow the presence of a
Union representative in a disciplinary setting did violate the Agreement-and quite possibly the statute, as interpreted in ...

Weingar-

ten.. .- the violation in this context was not a material one and should
this proceeding. In no way did it disadvanbe given no significance in
2 49
tage these two employees.
The Board's administrative law judge refused to defer to the arbitrator's resolution of this issue. 250 In particular, the judge rejected the ar245. See Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc. 242 N.L.R.B. at 1171 ("[T]he arbitrator found that...
the violation... does not invalidate [the employer's] action."). In this regard, other arbitrators have
also held that the "failure to comply with an employee's Weingarten rights should not necessarily
render the discipline void." Bi-State Dev. Agency v. Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 788, 105
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 319, 324 (1995) (Bailey, Arb.); see also County of Cook v. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Local 200, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 974, 980 (1995) (Wolff, Arb.)
(finding it "most appropriate not to void the Employer's action completely and only to exclude any
adverse evidence gathered at the ... investigative meeting").
246. Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. at 1171 (characterizing the arbitrator's ruling).
247. See Pac. Southwest Airline, 70 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 216. In considering the arbitrator's remedial order, it is important to note that "in fashioning remedies for unfair labor practices,
the Board [itself] has discretion under Section 10(c) to order reinstatement with or without backpay." Golay & Co. v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 259, 263 (7th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
248. See Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. at 1169 ("[T]he arbitrator found that...
[the] discharges shall be converted to suspensions."). It is not uncommon for arbitrators to reduce
terminations to suspensions where they find mitigating circumstances for an employee's misconduct. See, e.g., CSX Hotels, Inc. v. Hotel & Rest. Employees Local 863, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
702, 704 (1996) (Tharp, Arb.) ("This Arbitrator has reduced discharges to suspensions in many
cases over the years .... "). Indeed, at least among arbitrators themselves, the authority to reduce
discipline in this manner appears to be an "accepted principle." City of Boca Raton v. Fire Fighters
of Boca Raton, Local 1560, 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 759, 764 (1981) (Hoffman, Arb.). For an academic discussion of this issue, see Peter Seitz, Substitution of DisciplinarySuspension for Discharge(A Proposed "Guide to the Perplexed" in Arbitration), 35 ARB. J. 27 (1980).
249. Pac.Southwest Airline, 70 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 215.
250. Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. at 1170:
The Administrative Law Judge did not defer the... [Section] 8(a)(1) allegations of the
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bitrator's conclusion that the employer's denial of union representation
was not material because it did not prejudice the interrogated employees. 211 While acknowledging that the arbitrator's reasoning had "a great
deal of logic behind it,"'252 the judge found no authority supporting the

proposition that an alleged lack of prejudice to the employee is a relevant consideration in analyzing a Weingarten violation. 3
However, the Board disagreed with the judge.254 Relying on Spielberg, the Board held that the arbitrator's analysis satisfied its traditional
requirements for deferral. 255 The Board explained that, under Spielberg,25 6 it generally defers to arbitration decisions that are "not clearly
repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. 257 While declining to
adopt the arbitrator's reasoning, 258 the Board found that his analysis did
not do "substantial violence" to the principles announced in Weingar-

complaint to the arbitration decision; instead he found that [the employer's] telephone
conversations with [the employees], which were conducted without the presence of a union representative as requested by [the employees], violated the Act under the principles
explained in... Weingarten ....
25 1. See id. at 1176 ("I am not persuaded nor convinced that these ... were de minimis violations, nor were they remedied by the fact that a union representative was present during the [other]
interviews .. ");cf Westside Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 327 N.L.R.B. 661, 666 (1999) (holding
that the provision of union representation at a subsequent interview "does not work in mitigation or
repudiation" of a denial of representation at an initial interview, "nor does it render the [statutory]
violation[] de minimus [sic]").
242 N.L.R.B. at 1176; cf Cook Paint & Varnish. Co., 246
252. Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc.,
N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (1979) ("[T]he arbitrator's award in Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc. represents
that arbitrator's effort to accommodate conflicting legitimate interests."), enforcement denied, 648
F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
253. See Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. at 1176:
[I]n reviewing numerous Board Decisions and court decisions, I have not ascertained
that a question of whether a Weingarten ...type of violation has occurred can be determined by what might have occurred if a union representative had been present during the
interview. Accordingly, I conclude that violations did occur during the telephone conversations involved herein, whether or not the presence of a union representative during
those telephone conversations would have altered the responses given by [the employees].
254. See id. at 1169 ("Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge.... we would... defer the
8(a)(1) [Weingarten]allegations to the arbitrator's award.").
255. See id at 1170 ("In our opinion the arbitrator's discussion of both the contractual and
statutory issues and his resolution of the matter meets [sic] the Spielberg standards for deferral.").
256. Although the Board's deferral policy has since gone through "various twists and turns,"
Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1986), "Spielberg remains the seminal statement of
the Board's deference policy." Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1491 (DC. Cir. 1991).
257. Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. at 1170 (citing Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955)).
258. Id. at 1171 ("[W]e neither approve the arbitrator's nor reject the Administrative Law
Judge's analysis of Weingarten.").
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ten, 259 and thus was not repugnant to the Act's objectives. 260 Accord-

ingly, the Board elected to defer to the arbitrator's treatment of the employer's Weingarten violation, 261 and dismissed the General Counsel's
complaint.26 2

The Board did not specifically focus on the remedial aspects of the
arbitrator's decision. 263 However, the effect of its ruling was to defer to
the arbitrator's refusal to award complete make-whole reliefe64 at a time
when the Board itself awarded such relief "whenever ...

an employer

[had] disciplined an employee for conduct which was [the] subject of an
interview conducted in violation of Weingarten."'265 The propriety of deferral under
these circumstances has since been affirmed in other Board
6
cases.

26

259. Id.; see also Liberal Mkt., Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 807, 816 (1982) ("[T]he majority [in Pacific
Southwest Airlines, Inc.] declined to pass upon whether they would have applied Board precedent in
the same fashion as the arbitrator, noting that the arbitrator's analysis did 'no substantial violence
thereto."').
260. See Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. at 1171; see generally Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am., 331 N.L.R.B. 259, 261 (2000) ("The 'clearly repugnant' standard does not require
that the arbitrator's award be totally consistent with Board precedent.").
261. See Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 91, 96 (1980) ("[Tlhe Board [in Pacific Southwest Airlines] deferred to an arbitral award upholding the suspension of employees who, despite
having union representation, refused to be interviewed in preparation for arbitration of another employee's discharge. The absence of representation in a telephone conversation was held immaterial
to the result.").
262. See Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. at 1171. When the Board finds deferral
appropriate, "the arbitration award becomes the sole remedy for both contractual and statutory violations." Local Union No. 715, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136, 1138 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). Thus, where "the arbitration proceeding itself met the tests of Spielberg, and ... [the
employer] has, in fact, complied with the arbitrator's award, the complaint ... should be dismissed." Arnold Junior Fenton, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 202, 205 (1979).
263. See generally Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (1979) ("[W]hen the
Board defers to an arbitrator's award under Spielberg, the Board does not pass on the merits of the
controversy."), enforcement denied, 648 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981). However, the Board did quote
the portion of the arbitrator's decision ordering the employer to reinstate the employees "without
any retroactive compensation," Pac. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. at 1169, and thus obviously recognized that the arbitrator had refused to award them backpay. See Schrank v. Bliss, 412
F. Supp. 28, 39 (M.D. Fla. 1976) ("A claim for back pay seeks retroactive compensation .... ).
264. The Board has stated that "[t]he guiding principle underlying the award ofbackpay is that
[employees] must be made whole for the losses that they have suffered by reason of the employer's
unfair labor practice." Cont'l Ins. Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 579, 583 (1988). Thus, an award of backpay
may be "one of the most important components of a 'make-whole'... award." Dushaw v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 1229, 1235 (N.D. Ohio 1992), rev'don other grounds, 66 F.3d 129, 133
(6th Cir. 1995).
265. Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 599 (1980) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part),
overruled by Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222-23 (1984).
266. See, e.g., Cone Mills Corp.-White Oak Plant, 273 N.L.R.B. 1515, 1516 (1985) ("It is well
settled that a failure to give a complete make-whole remedy does not render an [arbitrator's] award
clearly repugnant [to the Act].").
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In particular, the Board has interpreted Spielberg to authorize deferral to an arbitrator's decision that is not "palpably wrong ,,267 -that is, the
Board may defer "unless. the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an
interpretation consistent with the Act." 268 In Combustion Engineering,
Inc.,269 the Board specifically held that "an arbitration decision awarding
reinstatement without backpay where such backpay would have been included in any Board directed remedy [is] not palpably270wrong and [is]
susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act.
Thus, on the same day it decided Kraft and awarded backpay and
other make-whole relief in several other Weingarten cases, 27 I the Board
in Amoco Texas Refining Co. 272 again deferred to an arbitrator's decision
reinstating an alleged Weingarten victim without an award of backpay.273 In finding that deferral was "appropriate under the Spielberg
principles," the Board effectively rejected the General Counsel's contenbecause it failed
tion that the arbitrator's award was repugnant to the Act 274
to "make [the employee] whole for the loss of backpay."
These cases make it clear that deferral to arbitration may be appropriate even though the relief awarded by the arbitrator "is not coextensive with the Board's remedy in unfair labor practice cases. 2 75 Although

267. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) (quoting Int'l Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923,
929 (1962), affd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964)); Int'l Union of Elec.
Workers, Local Union No. 130, 200 N.L.R.B. 760, 764 (1972):
In determining whether it would effectuate statutory policy to give binding effect to an
arbitration proceeding, the Board does not require that the arbitrator must have ruled on
the issues in the same way the Board would have done; it is enough to satisfy its policy
standard that the arbitrator's decision and remedy is not 'palpably' wrong ....
268. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
269. 272 N.L.R.B. 215 (1984).
270. Derr & Gruenwald Constr. Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 266, 273 (1994) (construing Combustion
Eng'g, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. at 215); see also Texaco, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 1259, 1260 (1986) ("[W]e
find that the arbitrator's award is in no way repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act....
The fact that the arbitrator effectively reduced the discipline by directing the employees reinstated
without backpay does not diminish our finding.").
271. See Dobranski, supra note 67, at 325 & n. 171.
272. 251 N.L.R.B. 1528 (1980).
273. See id. at 1529.
274. Id.
275. Derr & Gruenwald Constr. Co., 315 N.L.R.B. at 267 n.7; see also Laborers Int'l Union,
331 N.L.R.B. 259, 261 (2000) ("Deferral may be appropriate even where an arbitrator has not imposed the same remedy that the Board would impose."); Consol. Freightways, 290 N.L.R.B. 771,
773 (1988) ("Certainly, there may be circumstances that the Board will defer to an arbitrator's
award that does not include the same remedy as the Board would require to remedy an unfair labor
practice."). On the other hand, deferral may not be appropriate where "the arbitrator's remedial
power... is not coextensive with that of the Board." Kan. Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. 543, 550
(1972) (emphasis added).
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there is no authority specifically addressing the issue, 2 7 6 the Board undoubtedly would apply this principle in the converse situation and defer
277
to an arbitrator's award of make-whole relief to a Weingarten victim,

even in cases in which Taracorp would now prohibit the Board itself
from granting such relief.278 Indeed, one Board member has asserted that

an arbitrator's ability to award employees more "potent" and279
"valuable"
relief than the Board exemplifies the desirability of deferral.,
c. The FLRA is also Likely to Defer to Arbitration Awards
in Weingarten Cases
The FLRA, which generally shares the Board's view of arbitration, 280.1
is equally likely to dfrtanabtao'
defer to an arbitrator's remedial treatment of a
276. Although "the issue of deferral raises a question of law," resolution of the question in individual cases "frequently turns on the facts." Dayton Power & Light Co., 267 N.L.R.B. 202, 202
(1983). Thus, it is not uncommon for "a search of the Board's decisions with respect to deferral [to]
provide[] no precedent." Prestige Bedding Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 690, 699 (1974).
277. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv., 275 N.L.R.B. 430, 432 (1985) (deferring to an arbitrator's resolution of a Weingarten claim even though the arbitrator's decision may not have "comport[ed] precisely with certain Board decisional precedent"); cf Anaconda Co. v. Dist. Lodge No.
27, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 693 F.2d 35, 38 (6th Cir. 1982) (upholding an arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee who had been denied union representation even though the arbitrator "may not
have applied Weingarten correctly"). See generally Crown Zellerbach Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 385, 387
(1974) ("Certainly in reaching his decision and issuing an award, an arbitrator may... determine to
give a complete award or a partial award, depending on how he assesses the merits of the situation.").
278. In Howard Elec. Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 338 (1967), for example, the Board deferred to an
arbitrator's award of backpay to an employee who, "according to the usually prescribed [Board]
remedy, would not receive backpay or reinstatement." Id. at 341. Noting that Spielberg itself "specifically states the arbitration award need not necessarily be the one the Board would issue," the
Board held that the arbitrator's award of backpay was "clearly not repugnant to the policies or purposes of the Act." Id. But see Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 396, 398 (1974) (Fanning &
Jenkins, Members, dissenting) (criticizing Board doctrine that "substitutes the award of a private
arbitrator for the mandate of Section 10(c)").
279. Texaco, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 375, 378 (1977) (Penello, Member, dissenting); cf Toyota of
S.F., 280 N.L.R.B. 784, 798 (1986) (finding deferral to be appropriate because the arbitrators had
"entered a full and complete remedy," and a Board remedy "would add nothing to what the Union
[could already] enforce"); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237, 246 (2d Cir. 1975):
[The Board has] emphasized that its policy is to honor arbitration awards which satisfy
the Spielberg criteria, regardless of whether or not it would have made similar awards, or
granted similar relief had the matters been before it de novo .... That does not mean that
if an arbitrator finds an unfair labor practice to have been committed, the Board may not
imposefurther remedies available to it under the Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
280. See, e.g., Dep't of Air Force, 51 F.L.R.A. 675, 687 (1995) (noting that "arbitrators bring
their 'informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution to a problem, [which] is especially
true when it comes to formulating remedies [where] the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide
variety of situations"') (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
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Weingarten violation, 281 even though there is a "distinction between deference to arbitration in the federal sector ... and deference to arbitration
in the private sector., 282 The difference stems from the fact that Section
16(d) of the FSLMRS 283 generally gives aggrieved parties the option of
pursuing unfair labor practice claims in proceedings before the Authority
or in arbitration,2 84 but not in both forums.2 85 This provision, which has
no direct counterpart in the NLRA,28 6 has prompted the FLRA to ques597 (1960)); see also United States Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 981 F.2d 1339, 1343 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ("[T]he Authority has consistently recognized that arbitrators have 'great latitude in fashioning remedies."') (quoting United States Dep't of Air Force, 25 F.L.R.A. 969, 971 (1987)).
28 1. See United States Dep't of Navy, 53 F.L.R.A. 390, 399 (1997) ("Authority precedent establishes that arbitrators have broad authority to fashion remedies; the Authority has consistently
denied [challenges to arbitration awards] that attempt to substitute another remedy for that formulated by the arbitrator."); cf Portsmouth Fed. Employees Metal Trades Council, 34 F.L.R.A. 1150,
1152 (1990) (discussing the contention that "the question of whether a disciplinary action should be
overturned because of the [employer's] failure to afford union representation should be determined
by an arbitrator on a case-by-case basis").
282. Michele L. Adelman, The D.C. Circuit Struggles With Standards of Reviewability, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 960, 988 (1988); see also I.R.S., 47 F.L.R.A. 1091, 1109 (1993) ("[T]he basis
for deferral ... in the Federal sector is not nearly as compelling as in the private sector."); see generally United States v. Prof'I Air Traffic Controllers Org., 653 F.2d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir. 1981)
("[T]here are important differences between labor relations in the private and public sectors, and...
these differences compel different treatment of the two groups.").
283. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(d) (2000). The provision states, in pertinent part, that "issues which can
be raised under a grievance procedure may, in the discretion of the aggrieved party, be raised under
the grievance procedure or as an unfair labor practice [before the Authority], but not under both
procedures." Id. (emphasis added).
284. See Dep't of Commerce v. FLRA, 976 F.2d 882, 888 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The import of...
[Section 7116(d)] is clear: federal employees generally have the right to choose between bringing
their employment-related complaints as [unfair labor practice] charges, or as grievances under the
employees' negotiated grievance procedure."); Yates v. United States Soldiers' & Airmen's Home,
533 F. Supp. 461, 463 (D.D.C. 1982) ("An employee aggrieved by [an employer's] action has the
option of either filing an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA, or pursuing the matter through
the grievance mechanism in the collective bargaining agreement."); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 48 F.L.R.A. 566, 570 (1993) (noting that Section 16(d) gives an aggrieved party "the option of
raising an issue as an unfair labor practice or as a grievance").
285. See United States Marshals Serv. v. FLRA, 708 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1983)
("[W]here an issue can be raised either as a grievance under the contract or as an unfair labor practice complaint, the complainant must elect one or the other procedure."); I.R.S., 47 F.L.R.A. at 1104
("[U]nder the Authority's established interpretation of Section 7116(d) of the Statute, the issue
raised as an unfair labor practice [is] precluded from being raised in arbitration.").
286. Unlike the FSLMRS, the NLRA permits a party to "concurrently pursue both the arbitration and the unfair labor practice routes." Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410,
1423 (1964) (Brown, Member, concurring) (emphasis added); see also F.A.A. Spokane
Tower/Approach Control, 15 F.L.R.A. 668, 676 (1984) (citing Section 7116(d) in observing that
"the Statute itself is unlike the National Labor Relations Act in that it provides for an election by an
aggrieved party to proceed under the negotiated agreement or via the unfair labor practice route");
cf I.R.S., 47 F.L.R.A. at I110 (asserting that "one of the prudential considerations strongly supporting the NLRB's policy of deferral is absent in the Federal sector" because Section 16(d) "expressly
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tion its authority287to adopt "a deferral policy similar to that of the NLRB
under Collyer."
However, the FSLMRS, like the NLRA,288 clearly "endorses arbitration as an effective means of resolving disputes,, 289 and the FLRA has
been no less inclined than the Board to bind parties to the consequences
of their election to arbitrate. 290 Thus, even if the FLRA is statutorily precluded from deferring to contractual grievance and arbitration procedures in Collyer-type situations, 29' it may nevertheless defer to prior arprovid[es] the aggrieved party with a choice").
287. I.R.S., 47 F.L.R.A. at 1106; see also F.A.A., 15 F.L.R.A. at 675 ("[T]he Authority has
never adopted a deferral policy analogous to that in Collyer."); I.R.S., 11 F.L.R.A. 655, 666 n.7
(1983) ("[I]t does not appear that the Federal Labor Relations Authority has embraced [the Collyer]
doctrine ....
").But see IRS v. FLRA, 963 F.2d 429, 438 n.1I (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting the contention that "section 7116(d) affirmatively prevents the Authority from following a policy of deferring to arbitration like that adopted by the National Labor Relations Board in Collyer"); Dep't of
Treasury, 19 F.L.R.A. 421, 434 n.9 (1985) ("1 would recommend application of the so-called Collyer doctrine ...").
288. See Int'l Longshoremen's Union, Local No. 151, 294 N.L.R.B. 674, 674 (1989) ("[OJur
national labor policy, as set out in Section 203(d) of the Act, encourages resort to the grievancearbitration procedure as the preferred method of resolving labor-management disputes."); L. A. R.
Elec., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 702, 703 (1985) ("[B]oth national labor policy and congressional mandate
establish consensual grievance-arbitration procedures as the preferred method for the resolution of
labor disputes between parties to a labor contract."); Taft Broad. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 202, 211 (1970)
(noting that "the national labor policy expressed in the Act favors arbitration").
289. I.R.S,, 47 F.L.R.A. at 1105; see also IRS, 963 F.2d at 439 n.11 (referring to "the
FSLMRS's strong policy in favor of arbitration and private dispute resolution"); United States Marshals Serv., 708 F.2d at 1419 ("The centrality of arbitration is recognized in the [FSLMRS], which
requires the inclusion of grievance and arbitration procedures in all collective bargaining contracts.") (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (2000)); see generally Office & Prof'l Employees Int'l Union, Local 251, 331 N.L.R.B. 1417, 1443 n.142 (2000) (Brame, Member, dissenting) (discussing "the policies of the NLRA and otherfederal labor statutes that strongly encourage the use of voluntary
arbitration in the resolution of labor disputes") (emphasis added).
290. See Veterans Admin. Reg'l Office, 5 F.L.R.A. 463, 471 (1981) ("Parties, having agreed to
an arbitration of their differences, are bound by the arbitration award made upon the testimony before the arbitrator.") (quoting Bridgeport Rolling Mills Co. v. Brown, 314 F.2d 885, 886 (2d Cir.
1963)); see also Soc. Sec. Admin. & N.E. Program Serv. Ctr., No. 2-CA-50066, 1985 FLRA LEXIS
123, at *17 (Sept. 23, 1985) ("Our statute requires parties to abide by the consequences of final and
binding arbitration."); cf Kan. City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 868 (1978) (Truesdale, Member,
concurring) ("Under Spielberg, the Board will respect the parties' choice of the arbitral forum, and
will accord recognition to the arbitrator's resolution of their dispute ....).
291. Unlike deferral to arbitration under Spielberg, which occurs "after an [arbitration] award
has been made," deferral under Collyer occurs "before arbitration has been sought." McLean Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 710, 713 (1973) (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting), remanded sub
nom. Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Local Union No. 2188, Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Collyer is not the familiar case
of deferral to an arbitration award, but deferral to the arbitration procedure which is available but
not yet invoked."). The FLRA's view is that because the FSLMRS specifically authorizes employees to pursue their grievances before the FLRA if they are willing to forego the right to pursue them
in arbitration, a deferral policy analogous to that in Collyer "is neither necessary nor warranted in
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bitration decisions in accordance with the res judicata and collateral estoppel principles underlying the Board's decision in Spielberg.2 92 As one
federal court has explained:
In the private sector, a principal reason for deference to arbitration is to
allow the law of the shop and the industrial workplace to come into
play. Federal employment, circumscribed as it is by statute and regulation, may leave less room for this development, but there remains a
compelling explanation for the congressional encouragement to arbitrate, and that is the integrity of the bargaining and contract process itawards ... encourages reself. Expeditious enforcement of arbitration
293

sort to negotiated grievance procedures.

Indeed, the FLRA has noted that, like the Board's Spielberg docSection 7116(d) of the FSLMRS is actually intended "to prevent
relitigation of an issue in another forum after a choice of procedures in
which to raise the issue has been made by the aggrieved party." 295 Thus,
the FLRA has occasionally relied upon Spielberg to bind a party to an
arbitration decision that "overlaps" with a matter being considered by
the FLRA,2 96 notwithstanding the unique forum-selection rights codified
trine,294

the public sector." F.A.A., 15 F.L.R.A. at 676.
292. See, e.g., Soc. Sec. Admin. & N.E. Program Serv. Cr., 1985 FLRA LEXIS 123, at *11
("While there is, and can be, no deferral doctrine under our Statute, given the presence of Section
7116(d), the question nevertheless arises whether some form of. . . 'collateral estoppel' should...
be invoked so as to bar relitigation of [an] issue ....); cf Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B.
837, 854 (1971) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting) ("Spielberg represents a sort of res judicata rule,
designed to prevent relitigation of issues."); Paul Alan Levy, Deferral and the Dissident, 24 U.
MIcH.J.L. REF. 479, 495 n.88 (1991) ("Later developments have made it clear that deferral to arbitration [under Spielberg] constitutes a form of res judicata or collateral estoppel.").
293. United States Marshals Serv., 708 F.2d at 1420 (citation omitted); cf Soc. Sec. Admin. &
N.E. ProgramServ. Cr., 1985 FLRA LEXIS 123, at * 12 ("Arbitration is no less important to the
labor relations program for federal agencies and their employees, than it is in the private sector ....
If I do not defer to the Arbitrator's determination, I undercut a process which establishes a major
disputes-resolution mechanism.").
294. See L. A. R. Elec., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 702, 703 (1985) ("Spielberg... recognizes the traditional notion that it is not the function of judicial or administrative tribunals to relitigate issues
which previously had been heard and decided under fair and final and binding procedures."); Pac.
Intermountain Express Co., 264 N.L.R.B. 388, 391 (1982) (Zimmerman, Member, concurring)
("[L]ike the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, Spielberg was intended to promote
economy of litigation. A party having had the opportunity to litigate an issue in one forum and who
lost ought not to be permitted to try the same issue in another forum.").
295. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 18 F.L.R.A. 314, 316 (1985); see also Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 960 F.2d 176, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[T]he purpose of § 7116(d)... is to preclude duplicative proceedings by requiring an aggrieved party to make an election of remedies.").
296. Soc. Sec. Admin. & N.E. Program Serv. Cir., 1985 FLRA LEXIS 123, at **16-17; see
also United States Dep't of Def., Def. Contract Audit Agency, F.L.R.A. ALI Dec. No. 110, 1993
FLRA LEXIS 245, at * 18 (Sept. 30, 1993) (relying in part upon Spielberg in dismissing an unfair
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in Section 7116(d) of the FSLMRS.29 7
In addition, although arbitrators have the statutory authority to
award the same relief in unfair labor practice cases as the FLRA can
award in its own unfair labor practice proceedings, 298 deferral to an arbitrator's decision is not precluded by the FSLMRS "simply because the
remedy directed by the Arbitrator is different from that ordered by the
Authority in [comparable] unfair labor practice cases. 2 99 In National
Treasury Employees Union,300 for example, the Authority rejected the
contention that an arbitrator's award was deficient because he failed to
award backpay or other make-whole relief to employees who were terminated or downgraded as the result of an employer's unfair labor prac3°
awarded such
might
havesignificantly,
itselfeven
Authority and
even though
tice,
3 °2 the
therelief
Aumore
Conversely,
to the employees.
labor practice complaint where an earlier arbitration decision had "resolved all issues raised by the
Complaint"). See generally United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 976 F.2d 229,
234 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[lIt has been the practice of the FLRA, at least in some instances, to dismiss
unfair labor practice charges... in favor of arbitration.").
297. See generally United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 976 F.2d at 234 n.4 (discussing "the FLRA's self-imposed policy to defer" in unfair labor practice cases involving the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, despite "the explicit language of section
7116(d).... which provides a clear choice of forum to an aggrieved employee").
298. See Nat'l Treas. Employees Union, 48 F.L.R.A. 566, 570 (1993):
[A]n arbitrator is empowered to fashion the same remedies in the arbitration of a grievance alleging the commission of an unfair labor practice as those [the Authority is] authorized [to award] under section 7118 of the Statute. For arbitrators to ...determine
that they are not empowered to grant such relief is not consistent with the framework of
the Statute ....
Id. See generally United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 976 F.2d at 234-35 ("[T]he only
way the choice of forum provision contained in section 7116(d) can have meaning is if a similar
analytic approach is followed by both the arbitrator and the Authority with respect to matters over
which there is concurrent jurisdiction.") (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
299. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 29 F.L.R.A. 1283, 1283 (1987); see also NLRB 57
F.L.R.A. 880, 881 (2002) ("[Ain arbitrator is granted broad discretion to fashion a remedy that the
arbitratorconsiders to be appropriate.") (emphasis added).
300. 48 F.L.R.A. 566 (1993).
301. See id. at 571 ("We reject the Union's claims that the [arbitrator's] award is deficient because it fails to award a status quo ante remedy and backpay.").
302. The Authority explained its decision in terms that mirror the reasoning in many of the
Board's deferral cases:
In choosing to file a grievance rather than filing an unfair labor practice [charge] with the
Authority, the Union chose the judgment and discretion of the Arbitrator rather than that
of the Authority. We will not disturb that choice by substituting our judgment for that of
the Arbitrator when there is no basis ...for concluding that a status quo ante remedy or
a backpay remedy is compelled by the Statute.
Id. at 571; cf.Andersen Prestress Div. Andersen Sand & Gravel Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 1204, 1205 n.6
(1985) ("Deferral recognizes that the parties have accepted the possibility that an arbitrator might
decide a particular set of facts differently than would the Board. This possibility, however, is one
which the parties have voluntarily assumed through collective bargaining.").
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thority has also specifically held that an arbitrator's award of makewhole relief to an employee whose Weingarten rights were violated is
not "contrary to law, 30 3 despite citing another FLRA decision3 °4 in
which it held that an administrative law judge's award of such relief was
precluded 30by
its previous adoption of the Board's remedial analysis in
5
Taracorp.

d. The Prospect of Deferral Discourages Weingarten Victims from
Invoking Board Procedures
The Board's refusal to award make-whole relief in Weingarten
cases offers employees no assurance that "they will receive meaningful
redress if they pursue a denial of their statutory right to representation
through unfair labor practice procedures. 30 6 Because employees are
likely to seek vindication of their rights in the forum in which their potential recovery is greatest, 30 7 Weingarten victims and their unions may
prefer to challenge violations of the right to union representation in arbitration, 30 8 rather than in Board proceedings. 30 9 As one commentator has

303. United States Dep't of Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 39 F.L.R.A. 717, 720 (1991). The
FLRA's "contrary to law" standard derives from the language of the FSLMRS itself. See 5 U.S.C. §
7122 (2000) (authorizing the FLRA to refuse to enforce arbitration awards that are "contrary to any
law, rule, or regulation"). However, the Board's administratively-established standards for deferring
to arbitration under Spielberg are also occasionally characterized in the same language. See, e.g.,
Hershey Chocolate Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1067 (1960) (noting that application of the Spielberg
deferral standards does not prejudice the right of employees to "resort to the Board" if the arbitrator's decision is "contrary to law").
304. See United States Dep't of Veterans Affairs Med Ctr., 39 F.L.R.A. at 720 (citing United
States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431 (1990)).
305. See Bureau of Prisons,35 F.L.R.A. at 443-44 (discussing Dep't of Navy, Charleston Naval Shipyard, 32 F.L.R.A. 222 (1988)). The FLRA's remedial approach to Weingarten, as adopted
in CharlestonNaval Shipyard and subsequently modified in Bureau of Prisons,is discussed in more
detail infra at notes 353-371 and accompanying text. For a prior academic discussion of the approach, see Labor & Employment Law Notes, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1990, at 50, 51-52.
306. See Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. at 447.
307. See United States Dep't of Treasury, I.R.S., 44 F.L.R.A. 1306, 1311-12 (1992)
("[I]nformed employees.. . can be expected to select the forum where their award is worth more.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
308. One pair of commentators has observed that "under current law an arbitrator's power to
formulate a specific remedy is limited only by the limits of the parties' bargaining and submission
agreement." MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. STNICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 11 (2d ed.
1990); see also Margolis, McTeman, Scope, Sacks & Epstein v. Official & Prof l Employees Int'l
Union Local 30, 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 740, 744 (1983) (Richman, Arb.) ("Absent restrictive
contract language, broad remedial power is deemed inherent in the Arbitrator.") (emphasis added).
309. See Unnico Serv. Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local Lodge
2541, 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 432, 436 (1999) (Marcus, Arb.) ("The Weingarten result has been
adopted in arbitration jurisprudence to provide some relief to employees who have been deprived of
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explained:
[I]f the Board had not retreated from the original reinstatement remedy
for Weingarten violations, the most likely forum for a favorable union
result would be the Board and not an arbitrator. The more Board and
court doctrines favor employers, however, the more likely it will be
that unions will turn to arbitrators to resolve workplace disputes involving both statutory and contract entitlements. i0
Encouraging parties to pursue their rights in arbitration is, of
course, the principal objective of the Board's deferral doctrine.3 11 In that
regard, the Board has indicated that "the flexibility of remedies is a major advantage of arbitration, 31 2 because "[i]ndustrial peace is more
likely to result from awards tailored to specific circumstances than those
applied mechanically to diverse situations." 3 i 3 Nevertheless, although
the flexibility of arbitration may often be a valid reason for deferring to

the right to union representation when they reasonably believe they face disciplinary action."); cf
Naval Surface Weapons Ctr. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District 160, 118
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 55, 58 (2002) (Allen, Arb.) (describing a union that "withdrew [an] Unfair
Labor Practice Charge and sought remedy by way of the arbitration process").
310. Dennis 0. Lynch, Special Topics in Labor Relations: The Role ofArbitrationin Collective
BargainingDispute Proceedings:Essay: Statutory Rights and Arbitral Values: Some Conclusions,
44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 617, 641 (1989). But see Lancaster City Schs. v. Lancaster Educ. Ass'n, 81
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1024, 1028 (1983) (Abrams, Arb.) ("The National Labor Relations Board
enforces Weingarten, not labor arbitrators.") (emphasis added).
311. See NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 383 (3d Cir. 1980) (Garth, J.,
concurring) ("Deference to arbitration under the three-prong Spielberg test contributes significantly
to... the encouragement of arbitration as a critical factor in labor-management relations."); Clara
Barton Terrace Convalescent Ctr., 225 N.L.R.B. 1028, 1034 (1976) ("[T]he purpose of the Spielberg doctrine is to enhance the status of grievance and arbitration proceedings and to encourage the
parties to collective-bargaining agreements to resort to such remedies rather than to the
Board ...").
312. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 215, 217 n.ll (1984); see also Triple A Mach.
Shop, 245 N.L.R.B. 136, 139 (1979) (Penello, Member, dissenting) (asserting that flexibility in
fashioning remedies "is one of the values of arbitration"). The courts have also noted that "the formulation of remedies by the arbitrator is an area in which flexibility and broad discretion are particularly appropriate." Communication Workers v. Forward Telecasting, Inc., NO. 83-C-325-C,
1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16339, at *14 (W.D. Wis. June 10,1983) (citing United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 563, 567 (1960)).
313. Combustion Eng'g, 272 N.L.R.B. at 217 n.ll; see also Hammermill Paper Co., 252
N.L.R.B. 1236, 1238 (1980) (Penello, Member, dissenting) (discussing "the efficacy of deferral to
arbitration and of arbitration to achieve a fair and just result and to foster industrial peace"); William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 351 (1970) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting) (referring to "arbitration and its inherent flexibility and adjustment to unforeseen circumstances"). See generally Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1320 (10th Cir. 1981) ("Federal
labor law looks favorably on binding arbitration, based on sound policies like promotion of labor
peace ....).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

45

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 9
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 21:2

an arbitrator's award,3 14 deferral in this context will undoubtedly result
in the inconsistent remedial treatment of Weingarten violations.315
Thus, to the extent the limited remedy available under Taracorp
creates an incentive for employees and their unions to arbitrate their
Weingarten claims,31 6 that approach may be "destructive of that uniformity of interpretation and effectuation of the policies of the Act vital
to the proper administration of the law.0 1 7 For this reason, the Board
should adopt a remedial approach to Weingarten violations that is generally consistent with the Kraft approach still followed by most labor arbitrators,318 in order to avoid creating an undesirable incentive for employees to circumvent the Board's procedures for remedying unfair labor
practices in favor of contractual provisions for doing so.319
C. The Availability of Make- Whole Relief Would More Effectively Deter
314. See Exxon Corp. v. Local Union 877, 980 F. Supp. 752, 760 (D.N.J. 1997) ("Deference to
arbitration serves to 'promote the benefits of labor arbitration-speed, flexibility, informality and
finality."') (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir.
1993)); Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. at 1238 (Penello, Member, dissenting) ("It is...
flexibility which has made arbitration one of the most important tools in industrial relations in this
country today.... [R]efusing to defer [to arbitration] ...ultimately serves to undermine the flexibility which makes arbitration the valuable tool that it is.").
315. See Bi-State Dev. Agency v. Amalgamated Transit Div. 788, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
319, 324 (1995) (Bailey, Arb.) (noting that "arbitration decisions concerning a violation of [an] employee[']s Weingarten rights vary across the board in their outcome"). In this regard, "the parties
and the process are both better served by the stability provided by ...precedential decisions,"
I.R.S., 47 F.L.R.A. 1091, 1108 (1993), and arbitration decisions, unlike those of the Board, generally have "no precedential value." Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 851 (1971) (Jenkins,
Member, dissenting).
316. See supra notes 306-315 and accompanying text; infra notes 317-19 and accompanying
text.
317. Newspaper Web Pressmen's Union No. 6, 207 N.L.R.B. 856, 861 (1973); see also Authorized Air Conditioning Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 131, 137 & n.23 (1978) ("[T]he effective administration of the Act is best served by remedies which are uniformly applicable") (ellipses omitted) (quoting Russell Motors, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 351, 351 (1972)); Bowman Transp., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B.
1147, 1151 (1958) (discussing the Board's effort to "assure uniformity in [its] remedial orders").
But see NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The national policy in favor of labor arbitration recognizes that the societal rewards of arbitration outweigh a need
for uniformity of result ....
").
318. See generally Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1321 (1982) (Hunter, Member,
dissenting) ("Of course the Board is not bound by arbitral precedent. To ignore this remarkably consistent 'industrial common law,' however,.., is neither good sense, nor good law.") (quoting
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1961)).
319. See generally NLRB v. Gen. Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965, 969 n.15 (3d Cir. 1981)
("Regardless of its deferral policy, the Board retains the primary responsibility and power to adjudge unfair labor practices."); NLRB v. Gen. Drivers, Local Union No. 886, 264 F.2d 21, 23 (10th
Cir. 1959) ("It is the primary responsibility of the Board to fashion an appropriate remedy for an
unfair labor practice in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act ...").
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Future Weingarten Violations

1. The Cease-and-Desist Order Presently Available Under Taracorp is
not a Sufficient Deterrent
There is yet another compelling policy argument for rejecting the
limited remedial approach to Weingarten violations the Board adopted in
Taracorp.320 This argument is premised upon the fact that one of Congress' primary purposes in enacting the NLRA was "to stop and to prevent unfair labor practices., 32' Deterrence of future unlawful conduct is
remtherefore an important consideration in formulating the appropriate
322
edy for the violation of an employee's Weingarten rights.
The analysis in Taracorp, which generally limits the remedy for a
Weingarten violation to the issuance of a cease-and-desist order, 32 3 does
not adequately serve this statutory objective.324 In this regard, one fed320. One Board administrative law judge has suggested that the availability of make-whole
relief for a Weingarten violation can be justified on the ground that "restoration of the status quo
ante [is] essential in order to give meaning to the statutory right." La. Council No. 17, 250 N.L.R.B.
880, 900 (1980); see also NLRB v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 600 F.2d 120, 123 (8th Cir. 1979) (referring to several unidentified Board cases holding that "restoration of the status quo is... the only
effective remedy" for a Weingarten violation).
321. Int'l Union, United Auto Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 643 (1957); see also Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1547, 225 N.L.R.B. 331, 346 (1976) ("A major purpose of the
Board's remedies for... violations [of the Act] is to deter future repetition ....); Southland
Dodge, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 276, 280 (1973) (describing deterrence of unfair labor practices as "a
remedial objective of the Act").
322. See, e.g., Bi-State Dev. Agency v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 788, 105 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 319, 324 (1995) (Bailey, Arb.) (stating that the remedy for a denial of union representation should "ensure that the [employer] accords employees their Weingarten rights in the future");
cf United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431,445 (1990) ("Although not in
itself a sufficiently justifying effect, deterrence is also certainly a desirable effect of a remedy.").
See generally Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 593 (1984) (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting) ("[The Board's statutory remedial authority] includes the power to devise remedies which will
deter employers ...from engaging in unfair labor practices. This policy of deterrence accords with
the general principle that a wrongdoer should not be allowed to benefit from misconduct.") (footnote omitted).
323. See Communication Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1986) ("If the employer violates Weingarten by excluding the union's representative from a disciplinary interview
and fires the employee solely because of the employee's misconduct, the Board enters only a cease
and desist order."); Martin v. Consol. Freightways, No. 84-5966, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14122, at
*13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 1985) (citing Taracorp for the proposition that "the appropriate remedy for
the violation of Weingarten rights is a cease and desist order and not reinstatement").
324. See, e.g., Davis Supermarkets, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 426, 469 (1992) (concluding that "a
mere cease-and-desist order would not deter the recurrence of unfair labor practices"); R.L. White
Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 575, 578 (1982) (finding it "doubtful that a cease-and-desist order would deter
the recurrence of unfair labor practices"); Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 219 N.L.R.B. 414, 417
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eral appellate court has concluded that "[a]lthough Section 10(c) of the
Act gives the Board some discretion to determine when backpay, is an
appropriate remedy, the need to compensate a wrongfully discharged
employee and the importance of deterringfuture wrongful conduct by
the employer
generally require that the Board award a make-whole rem32 5
edy.

The Board itself has expressed a similar view, 326 noting that a
cease-and-desist order will often be insufficient to achieve the policy objectives of the Act.32 7 In Sinclair Glass Co.,328 for example, the Board
noted that a failure to award make-whole remedies such as backpay and
reinstatement 329 may leave an employer that has committed an unfair labor practice "with nothing more than a cease-and-desist slap on the wrist
rather than a monetary deterrent to the commission of the same or similar unfair labor practices. 330
The unfair labor practice at issue in Sinclair Glass did not involve
(1975) (Kennedy, Member, dissenting in part) (asserting that "cease-and-desist orders will be meaningless as a deterrent to the commission of similar unlawful conduct in the future").
325. Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). In applying the FSLMRS, the same court has similarly stated that "to effect the
deterrent and remedial goals of the Statute, the Authority must award the fullest measure of 'make
whole' relief." Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 856 F.2d 293, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
326. See Iron Workers Local Union 377, 326 N.L.R.B. 375 (1998) (Hurtgen & Brame, Members, dissenting in part):
Under Section 10(c) of the Act, the Board must fashion an appropriate remedy for the
unfair labor practices committed by respondents. In carrying out this responsibility, the
Board has traditionally been guided by the goal of restoring the status quo ante and fashioning a remedy which will eradicate the consequences of the unfair labor practice which
it has found. Significantly,... we know of no area in which the Board has [previously]
established a stated goal of giving less than a full make-whole remedy for employee
losses suffered from unfair labor practices.
Cf Farmers Co-Operative Gin Ass'n, 161 N.L.R.B. 887, 911-12 (1966) ("No remedial principle is
clearer than that restoration of the status quo ante tends to effectuate the policies of the Act.").
327. See, e.g., Cardinal Sys., 259 N.L.R.B. 456, 457 (1981) ("[A] cease-and-desist order,
standing alone, is insufficient to return the parties to the status quo existing prior to the commission
of the unfair labor practice and ... effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act."); Local 425,
United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., 125 N.L.R.B.
1161, 1164 (1959) (stating that a remedy that deters future unlawful conduct "more properly effectuates the purposes of the Act" than a "mere cease and desist order [that] will have little impact").
328. 188 N.L.R.B. 362 (1971),
329. See generally Dean Gen. Contractors, 285 N.L.R.B. 573, 573 (1987) (noting that "the
Board's traditional remedy is a make-whole order of reinstatement and backpay when an employee
has been discharged in violation of the Act").
330. Sinclair Glass Co., 188 N.L.R.B. at 363; see also Fikse Bros., 220 N.L.R.B. 1301, 130102 (1975) (Fanning, Member, dissenting) (asserting that the availability of make-whole relief "is a
matter of the utmost importance in the effectuation of [the Act]," so that employers and employees
"will know that an employer cannot violate this Act and escape with a slap on the wrist"), rev 'd and
remandedsub nom. Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
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the denial of union representation at an investigatory interview, 331 but
discrimination against employees for exercising their statutory right to
strike.332 An employer's interference with its employees' right to strike
is the type of serious unfair labor practice 333 that warrants an award of
3 34 Neverthemake-whole relief even under the reasoning of Taracorp.
less, a cease-and-desist order is likely to be as ineffective in deterring future Weingarten violations as it is in deterring any other unfair labor
practice, 3' 5 including interference with the statutorily protected right to
strike.336
Indeed, the FLRA has specifically noted that limiting the remedy
for Weingarten violations to the issuance of a cease-and-desist order
does not create a sufficient incentive for employers to afford representa331. Sinclair Glass predated Weingarten, when Board law was still unclear with respect to
"whether or not an employee summoned by management to an interview which the employee reasonably believed might result in his discipline was entitled to representation by his union at such
conference." Texaco, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 633, 642 (1980), enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981).
332. The right of employees to engage in a strike is specifically protected by Section 13 of the
Act. See Nat'l Football League, 309 N.L.R.B. 78, 81 n.12 (1992) (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 163
(2000)). The employer in SinclairGlass was found to have interfered with that right by paying its
nonstriking employees "hourly wage rates higher than those paid employees who participated in the
strike, even though the former strikers were performing comparable work." Sinclair Glass Co., 188
N.L.R.B. at 363. As a general proposition, "the grant of special benefits to [employees] who have
chosen not to strike unlawfully interferes with the right of those and other employees to strike in the
future." NLRB v. Rubatex Corp., 601 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1979).
333. See generallyRubatex Corp., 601 F.2d at 149:
Section 8(a)(l) of the National Labor Relations Act declares it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to interfere with rights guaranteed in § 7 of the Act, and § 7 guarantees
employees the right, generally, to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Not only is a strike one such concerted activity, but it has also been accorded special deference in the enactment of federal labor laws.
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)).
334. In addition to being protected by section 13 of the NLRA, a strike constitutes concerted
activity generally protected from employer interference under sections 7 and 8(a)(3) of the Act. See
NLRB v. Transp. Co. of Tex., 438 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1971). The Board in Taracorp noted that
discrimination against employees "for engaging in union or other protected concerted activities"
constitutes the "clearest example of when a make-whole remedy ...is appropriate." Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222 (1984).
335. See, e.g., N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 42, 55 (1990) (acknowledging that cease-anddesist orders may "not discourage employers from violating an employee's Weingarten rights"). See
generally Margolis, McTernan, Scope, Sacks & Epstein v. Official & Prof'l Employees Int'l Union,
Local 30, 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 740, 744 (1983) (Richman, Arb.) (characterizing the denial of
union representation at an investigatory interview as a "serious" violation of an employee's rights
that "warrants the imposition of a remedy which will prevent any further violation").
336. See Rubatex Corp., 601 F.2d at 151 ("A cease and desist order... might well be ineffective in dispelling the apprehensions of those employees who are aware that non-strikers were treated
more favorably in the past and know of no restriction on the company's ability to engage in the
same behavior in the future.").
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tional rights to their employees.337 As one FLRA administrative law
judge explained,3 38 "[ilt is hard to see how an [employer] can effectively
be deterred from ignoring Weingarten rights if it is... free to use the
fruits of the unlawful examination, 33 9 which is often the effect of a remedy limited to a cease-and-desist order.34 °
The Board has also acknowledged that the unavailability of makewhole relief for Weingarten violations may permit an employer "to
benefit directly from the commission of proscribed conduct; namely,
forcing [an employee] to submit to the unlawful interview, during which
information was obtained concerning the subject matter for which he
was disciplined. 34 ' In other words, the remedial approach to Weingarten
adopted in Taracorp effectively encourages employers to violate their
employees' Weingarten rights,342 and then use the fruits of their unlawful interviews to impose discipline on the employees whose rights they
have violated.34 3
This incentive is illustrated by the analysis in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil
Buyers Group, Inc., where the Board observed that an employer who
can commit unfair labor practices "secure in the knowledge that the
337. See United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431, 447-48 (1990).
338. The FSLMRS authorizes the FLRA to "delegate to an administrative law judge the power
to determine whether a person is engaging or has engaged in an unfair labor practice." Am. Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 944 F.2d 922, 924 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7105(e)(2)
(1988)).
339. F.A.A., 35 F.L.R.A. 645,662 (1990).
340. See Glenside Hosp., 234 N.L.R.B. 62, 70 n.33 (1978) ("A mere cease and desist order...
may serve only to represent formal acknowledgment of the law while the offender maintains full
possession of the fruits of its violation.") (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d
889, 894 (6th Cir. 1965)). See generally Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB,
426 F.2d 1243, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Effective redress for a statutory wrong should.., withhold
from the wrongdoer the 'fruits of its violation."') (quoting Montgomery Ward, 339 F.2d at 894).
341. Montgomery Ward & Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 826, 827 n.4 (1981), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1981); see also N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 300 N.L.R.B.
42, 55 (1990) ("[P]ermitting [an employer] to use [a] statement unlawfully obtained from [the employee] would essentially reward [it] for its unlawful conduct and would constitute a 'windfall' to
[the employer] ....
").
342. See Southeastern Pipe Line Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 341, 344 (1953) ("[R]efusing to apply the
usual reinstatement remedy would permit the [employer] to enjoy the fruits of its unlawful conduct
and would serve to encourage rather than discourage unfair labor practices by others."); Truesdale,
supra note 19, at 176 ("The victims of unlawful interviews ...argue that a mere cease-and-desist
order rewards the employer for violating employee rights.").
343. See Preferred Transp., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 2, 17 (2003) (Battista, Chairman, concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[W]here an employer violates the Weingarten principle and conducts
an unlawful investigation of employee misconduct, the fruit of that investigation can nonetheless be
used to discipline the employee for the misconduct. Phrased differently, the fruit of the poisoned
investigation can be used to discipline the employee.") (footnotes omitted).
344. 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995).
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Board can generally do no more than require it to cease and desist

'345

is

346

essentially at liberty to ignore its obligations under the Act. Thus, an
employer that can violate its employees' Weingarten rights knowing that
only a potentially insignificant remedy can be awarded 347 is unlikely to
be deterred from violating those rights.348
2. The FLRA has Modified the Board's Approach in Order to Deter
Future Weingarten Violations
In an effort to avoid the undesirable result under Taracorp,349 the
FLRA has elected not to limit the remedy for Weingarten violations to
the issuance of a cease-and-desist order, 350 but instead requires an employer that has violated an employee's Weingarten rights to repeat its
investigatory interview and afford the employee full statutory rights to
union representation.35 1 If it is then determined that the employer's
original disciplinary action was unwarranted, the employee must be
made whole for any losses found to have been suffered as the result of

345. Id. at 415 n.38.
346. See id. at 415 (noting that such employers "would be free to flout their obligations under
the Act, secure in the knowledge that the Board would be powerless fully to remedy their violations").
347. See Soc. Sec. Admin., Boston Region, 57 F.L.R.A. 264, 273 n.2 (2001) (Wasserman,
Member, dissenting in part) (asserting that "a relatively insignificant cease and desist order... may
have little or no effect on future behavior").
348. See Vt. Dep't of Soc. Welfare v. Individual Grievant, 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 324, 329
(1986) (Cheney, Arb.) ("If the [employer] can violate [an employee's right to union representation
at an investigatory interview] knowing only a token penalty or no penalty is imposed, it is invited to
continue ignoring [the] procedural rights of [its] employees."); cf County of Cook v. Retail, Wholesale, & Dep't Store Union, Local 200, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 974, 980 (1995) (Wolff, Arb.)
(concluding that a remedial approach to a denial of union representation that essentially would have
enabled the employer to escape responsibility for its conduct "would reduce, if not eliminate" its
incentive to provide such representation "in future cases").
349. The ineffectiveness of the Taracorp approach to Weingarten is implicit in the Board's
observation, in another context, that "[a]n appropriate remedy contemplates that the employer shall
not retain the fruits of his unfair labor practices." Indianapolis Glove Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 479, 482
(1967); see also Nello Pistoresi & Son, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 905, 906 (1973) (asserting that "a remedy is necessary . .. to prevent the wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his unfair labor practice"),
enforcement denied, 500 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1974).
350. In considering the FLRA's remedial approach to Weingarten violations, it is important to
note that in some respects, the FLRA has "broader remedial authority than is possessed by the
NLRB." Prof'l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 584 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Of
particular potential significance in this context is the fact that the FSLMRS "does not contain a provision similar to Section 10(c) of the NLRA." Dep't of Navy, Charleston Naval Shipyard, 32
F.L.R.A. 222, 233 (1988).
351. See United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431, 447 (1990).
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the discipline.3 52
The evolution of this approach can be traced to the FLRA's, decision in Department of Navy, CharlestonNaval Shipyard,353 where it ini35 4 Specifitially purported to adopt the Board's analysis in Taracorp.
cally, the FLRA joined the Board in holding that make-whole remedies
are unavailable in Weingarten cases in which an employee is disciplined
for misconduct independent of the unlawful interview, 355 and "the employer's only violation is the denial of
[the] employee's request for un356
ion representation at [the] interview."
However, the FLRA also indicated that an award of make-whole relief remains appropriate when an employee is disciplined "as the result
of an act that was ...

an unfair labor practice. 3 57 In United States De-

partment of Justice, Bureau of Prisons,358 a FLRA administrative law
judge subsequently asserted that the Authority had thus recognized "exceptions" to the Taracorp approach in which it would continue to award
make-whole relief, such as revoking discipline that "flowed" from the
unlawful investigatory interview, in cases in which Weingarten has been
violated. 359 The judge relied on this reasoning in recommending that the
Authority rescind the discipline of an employee who appeared to have
been suspended, at least in part, on the basis of information obtained in

352.
353.

See id. at 447-48.
32 F.L.R.A. 222 (1988).

354. See id. at 233 ("We agree with the analysis and conclusion of the NLRB regarding remedies for Weingarten violations.") (discussing Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984)). The

FLRA has elsewhere indicated that in the "absence of Authority precedent concerning [an] issue, it
is both useful and appropriate to examine [Board] precedent." Fed. Trade Comm'n, 35 F.L.R.A.
576, 584 (1990); see also Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 785 F.2d 333, 336 (D.C. Cir.

1986) ("It is... appropriate [to] consider the decisions of the NLRB in [FLRA] cases.").
355.

Cf N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 42, 55 (1990) ("In Taracorp,... the Board, reversing

prior precedent, held that it will not impose a make-whole remedy, where the employer's only violation is the denial of an employee's request for representation at an investigatory interview.") (footnotes omitted).
356. See Dep't of Navy, CharlestonNaval Shipyard, 32 F.L.R.A. at 233; see also United States
Dep't of Justice, United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 39 F.L.R.A. 1431, 1437-38

(1991) ("The Authority in [Charleston] found that a make whole remedy is not appropriate 'where
the disciplinary action taken relates solely to employee misconduct independent of' the management
action found to constitute the unfair labor practice.") (quoting Dep 't of Navy, Charleston Naval
Shipyard,32 F.L.R.A. at 233).
357. Dep't of Navy, Charleston Naval Shipyard, 32 F.L.R.A. at 232-33 (interpreting Tara-

corp).
358.
359.

35 F.L.R.A. 431 (1990).
Id. at 473-74; cf United States Immigration & NaturalizationServ., 39 F.L.R.A. at 1437

(finding a characterization of Charleston as precluding make-whole relief "when an employee is
disciplined or discharged for misconduct or any other nondiscriminatory reason" to be "inappropriately broad").
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6

an unlawful investigatory interview. 0
The FLRA held that the judge's reliance on Charleston to support
36 1
because
an award of "traditional" make-whole relief was misplaced
362
Charleston had adopted the Board's analysis in Taracorp, and Taracorp generally precludes such relief unless the employee was discharged
for asserting the right to union representation.36 3 However, the Authority
then proceeded to articulate its own view of the proper remedy for
not disciWeingarten violations 364 in cases in which the employee was
365
representation.
union
to
right
the
asserting
for
solely
plined

Rather than limiting the relief for such violations to the issuance of
36 7
the
a cease-and-desist order,366 as the Board in Taracorp had done,
FLRA held that an employer that has violated an employee's Weingarten

rights must also repeat its investigatory interview with a union representative present, and then reconsider any disciplinary action imposed as the
result of the original unlawful interview. 368 In awarding this relief, the
FLRA emphasized "the need for a remedy, in addition to the traditional

cease and desist [sic] order, in cases where a denial of representation
rights has occurred.,

3 69

By requiring an employer to repeat its investiga-

360. See United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431, 474-75 (1990).
361. Id. at 441 ("[Iln recommending a traditional make-whole remedy encompassing rescission
of the disciplinary action, backpay, and restoration of any lost rights and privileges the Judge has
misapplied the Authority's decision in CharlestonNaval Shipyard.").
362. Id.
363. See Radisson Muehlebach Hotel, 273 N.L.R.B. 1464 (1985):
[W]e provide only a cease-and-desist order in situations where an employer interviews
an employee in violation of the requirements set forth in ... Weingarten ... , except in
cases where an employee is discharged for asserting his Weingarten rights or where the
reason for the discharge is itself an unfair labor practice.
Id. at 1464 n.3 (citing Taracorp).
364. See generally Dep't of Treasury, BATF, 24 F.L.R.A. 521, 531 (1986) (noting that the legislative history of the FSLMRS "indicates that ... private sector decisions interpreting Weingarten
were not to be 'determinative for the Federal Sector') (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1717, at
156 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2890).
365. See Dep't of Justice, United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 36 F.L.R.A. 41,
52-53 (1990) ("In [Bureau of Prisons], we considered in depth what remedy is appropriate where a
violation ... has occurred.").
366. The FLRA has elsewhere indicated that:
[A]n order directing that [an employer] cease and desist from violating the Statute and
post a notice of its commission of an unfair labor practice and the action it will take to
remedy the violation are routine elements of any relief ordered by the Authority to remedy an unfair labor practice.
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 48 F.L.R.A. 566, 571 (1993).
367. See Radisson Muehlebach Hotel, 273 N.L.R.B. at 1464 n.3 (construing Taracorp).
368. See Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. at 447-48.
369. Id. at 444; cf N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 42, 55 (1990) (discussing the contention
that "the Board's responsibility to devise remedies to 'undo the effects of violations of the Act[]' ...
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tion when Weingarten has been violated,37 ° the FLRA thus effectively
requires the employer "to show that no discipline ... has occurred or
will occur in the future based
on information obtained from the unlawful
37'
interview."
investigative
3. The Practical Implications of the FLRA's Approach
Ironically, the FLRA's remedial treatment of Weingarten violations
is actually more analogous to the Board's pre-Taracorpapproach than to
the one it adopted in Taracorp,372 which the FLRA still occasionally
professes to follow. 37 3 Prior to the Board's decision in Kraft, for example, one Board administrative law judge asserted that once an employer
has rescinded the disciplinary action taken against an employee whose
Weingarten rights were violated,3 74 it is "free, so far as the NLRA is
concerned, to conduct a lawful investigation.., and, by using lawful
procedures, to take such consequent and lawfully motivated personnel
action as it wishes. 3 75 This view was subsequently embraced by the
Board itself in Illinois Bell Telephone Co. ,376 a case decided on the same
day as Kraft, 377 where it stated that awarding make-whole relief for a
warrants a remedy [in Weingarten cases] more substantial than a cease-and-desist order") (quoting
Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 220 (1964)).
370. See Bureau of Prisons,35 F.L.R.A. at 449 n.4 ("[A] rerun of the interview is the only way
truly to restore the status quo ante.").
371. Dep 't of Justice, United States Immigration & NaturalizationServ., 36 F.L.R.A. at 53-54
(construing Bureau of Prisons).
372. Despite the similarities in the two acts, the statutorily protected rights of employees occasionally "evolve differently" under the FSLMRS and the NLRA. Headquarters Nat'l Aeronautics &
Space Admin., 50 F.L.R.A. 601, 608 n.5 (1995), enforced, 120 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1997), affd,
527 U.S. 229 (1999). In particular, "Congress sought to appropriate the general principles of Weingarten and allow those principles to evolve in the unique and varying circumstances of federal employment." Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1941 v. FLRA, 837 F.2d 495, 500 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
373. See, e.g., Dep't of Veterans Affairs Med. Cir., 49 F.L.R.A. 1624, 1643 (1994) (relying on
the purported adoption of Taracorp in Charleston Naval Shipyard in asserting that the FLRA follows "the National Labor Relations Board policy.., to grant a make whole remedy only when an
employee is discharged or disciplined for engaging in union or other protected concerted activity").
374. See generally United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 154 (1979) (noting that "the
Board has required the restoration of the status quo ante by requiring affirmative correction of [the]
personnel action").
375. Id. at 156.
376. 251 N.L.R.B. 932 (1980), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 674 F.2d 618
(7th Cir. 1982).
377. See I11.Bell Tel. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 148, 150 (1985) ("Kraft Foods... [was] issued the
same day as the Board's original decision in this case .... ), enforced sub nom. Communication
Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1986). Significantly, one Board member has asserted that
it was actually in Illinois Bell, rather than Kraft, that "the Board set forth the remedial standard ap-
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Weingarten violation
does not mean.., that, if [the employee] accepts reinstatement, [the
employer] is forever foreclosed from discharging her for [the conduct
that was the subject of the unlawful interview]. It cannot, however, do
so on the basis of any information obtained from the interview ....

This procedure remedies the unfair labor practice, while preserving
its employees, so long
[the employer's] right to discipline or discharge
378
as its actions do not contravene the Act.

a. Employees may have Difficulty Vindicating Themselves Once
Discipline has been Imposed
The principal problem with the FLRA's approach stems from the
difficulty employees are likely to have vindicating themselves, even with
the assistance of union representation, once an employer has made a disciplinary decision. 37 9 In particular, because an employer whose initial
disciplinary decision has been overturned may remain convinced that the
discipline it imposed was warranted,3 8 ° it may be inclined to "discount
[it] based
corrections or amplifications of the tainted evidence on3 which
8
its initial [decision] about what action should be taken. 1
propriate for Weingarten violations." Texaco, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 633, 638 (1980) (Truesdale,
Member, dissenting in part), enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981).
378. Ill. Bell Tel., 251 N.L.R.B. at 935 n.20; see also Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 91,
96 (1980) (holding that an employer found to have violated its employee's Weingarten rights was
"not precluded from [thereafter] discharging [him] for cause" as long as it did not base the discharge
on any "statements he may have made in the [unlawful] interview"); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
251 N.L.R.B. 612, 615 n.19 (1980) ("[l]f [the employee] does accept reinstatement, the [employer]
is not foreclosed from disciplining him for [the conduct that was the subject of the unlawful interview] so long as such action is not taken on the basis of any information obtained at the... interview."), enforcement denied, 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
379. See Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1048, 1056 (1982) (concluding that the "status quo
cannot.., be restored" by providing union representation "following the imposition of disciplinary
action," because "representation at this stage would likely be ineffective"); United States Postal
Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. at 156 ("[O]nce the employer [has made] a decision on the basis of... defective evidence, 'it becomes increasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself, and the value
of [union] representation is correspondingly diminished."') (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251, 263-64 (1975)).
380. See Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. at 96 (noting that an employer whose initial
disciplinary decision has been "nullified" due to its failure to comply with Weingarten may continue
to "believe it has evidence of... just cause" for discharge). Indeed, the Board has long presumed
that "a condition once established," including specifically an "employer's refusal to employ [an]
employee," will "continue in the absence of evidence showing that a change has occurred." Winn
Dixie Stores, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 777, 778 (1973), enforced, 502 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1974).
381. United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. at 156; cf.Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 264 ("The
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This suggests that where an employer has conducted an investigatory interview in violation of Weingarten, the Board should perhaps assume-as it effectively did under Kraft382 -that the information obtained at the unlawful interview "had a direct and causal relationship to
the employer's disciplinary decision,, 383 and that "restoration of the
status quo ante [is] the prima facie appropriate remedy. 38 4 Although
such an approach has been criticized on the ground that it is likely to result in an award of make-whole relief whenever Weingarten has been
violated,3 85 that concern appears to be
somewhat overstated, as demon386
strated by the analysis in Kraft itself.
In particular, the employer in Kraft argued that even if it had violated the Weingarten rights of the employee it discharged, make-whole
relief was precluded by Section 10(c) in view of an arbitrator's finding
that there was just cause for the discharge.3 87 The administrative law
judge concluded that this argument was contrary to the rationale of
Weingarten, which emphasized the difficulty employees have in vindicating themselves once an employer has conducted an unlawful investi-

employer [that has previously made a determination of guilt] may... be more concerned with justifying [its] actions than with re-examining them."). But see United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of
Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431, 449 n.4 (1990) ("[lI]t is not clear that requiring the [employer] to lawfully
conduct the interview and reconsider the disciplinary action would not produce a different outcome.").
382. See Communication Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that
under the Kraft approach, the Board "presume[d] in cases under Weingarten that, but for the violation of the Act, the employer would not have discharged the employee"); Dobranski, supra note 67,
at 326 ("The presumption [under Kraft Foods] is that the discipline stemmed from information derived from the [unlawful] interview.").
383. Texaco, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 633, 638 (1980) (Truesdale, Member, dissenting in part), enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981); cf Westside Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B.
661, 666 (1999) (characterizing an employer's assertion that its employees were not prejudiced by
its denial of their right to union representation as "speculative and unconvincing").
384. Texaco, 251 N.L.R.B. at 638 n.33 (Fanning & Penello, Members, concurring).
385. See id. at 638 (Truesdale, Member, dissenting in part).
386. See Dobranski, supra note 67, at 325 ("Under the facts presented in Kraft, the Board majority found that the employer met its burden by showing that its decision to discharge the employee
was not based on information obtained from the unlawful interview of that employee."); Truesdale,
supra note 19, at 176 ("In Kraft, the majority concluded that the employer had met its burden, and
therefore.., did not order reinstatement."). See generally Northwest Eng'g Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 190,
198 & n. 13 (1982) ("The Board has held that a make-whole order will not be routinely granted in
every case in which a Weingarten violation has been found.") (emphasis added) (citing Kraft and
Coyne Cylinder Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1980)).
387. See Kraft, 251 N.L.R.B. at 604. But see Burlington N. Motor Carriers, Inc. v. Individual
Grievant, 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 585, 591 (1987) (Goldstein, Arb.) (alluding to the distinction
between "the way the term just cause has developed under labor arbitration principles" and "the
development of 'cause' as it has been defined under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act").
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gatory interview. 388 Thus, the judge concluded that the arbitration hearing had come too late to overcome the initial investigatory taint, which
had "rendered unlawful that which may have otherwise been a lawful
discharge for cause. 3 89
However, the Board refused to adopt the judge's recommendation
that the employee be reinstated with backpay. 390 The Board agreed that
the employer had violated the employee's Weingarten rights, and acknowledged that the General Counsel had made the prima facie showing
necessary to support an award of make-whole relief.391 However, because the misconduct for which the employee was discharged was witnessed by several other employees who were lawfully interviewed before the terminated employee's interview took place, the Board held that
the employer had satisfied its burden of showing that its disciplinary decision was not based on information obtained at the unlawful inter2
39

view.

In several other cases decided prior to Taracorp, employers were
able to satisfy the evidentiary burden necessary to avoid an award of
make-whole relief under Kraft.393 In Coyne Cylinder Co. 394 for example,
the Board again refused to adopt an administrative law judge's recommendation that an employee whose Weingarten rights were violated be
reinstated and awarded backpay. 395 Relying on Kraft, the Board held that
make-whole relief was inappropriate because the employer's disciplinary decision was based "solely on information obtained prior to the
396
unlawful interview rather than anything obtained therein.
The Board subsequently reached a similar result in Ball Plastics
Division, Ball Corp.,397 where an employee was discharged for insubor-

388. See Kraft, 251 N.L.R.B. at 604 (discussing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. 420 U.S. 251,
263-64 (1975)).

389. Id.
390. Id. at 598.
391.

Id.

392. Id.
393.

This was the Board's alternative holding in McLean Hosp., 264 N.L.R.B. 459 (1982), for

example, where it affirmed an administrative law judge's refusal to award make-whole relief on the
ground that the General Counsel had not shown that the employer's discipline of the employee "was
based on the subject of the alleged unlawful interviews." Id. at 473. However, the judge also con-

cluded that even if the General Counsel had made such a showing, the employer had "negated [that]
showing by demonstrating that its decision to discipline was not based on information sought by the
interview." Id. at 474 (citing Kraft).
394. 251 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1980).
395. See id. at 1504.
396. Id.
397. 257N.L.R.B. 971 (1981).
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dination after she refused to do her assigned job.398 The Board found that
the employer violated the employee's Weingarten rights in a series of
investigatory interviews pertaining to the incident, and that the General
Counsel made a prima facie showing of the appropriateness of a makewhole remedy. 399 However, the Board also found that the employer had
established that its disciplinary decision was not based on information
obtained at the unlawful interviews because there was "no indication that
which [the employer]
any information was gleaned from the interviews
4
did not already possess before the interviews. 00
Finally, in Axelson, Inc. ,401 an employee was terminated for conduct
that was the subject of an interview conducted in violation of Weingarten.4 °2 Relying on Kraft,403 the administrative law judge held that because the discharge decision was actually based on information the employer obtained prior to the unlawful interview, "and not on anything
obtained therein, ' '4°4 the employer was not required to reinstate the employee or provide him with backpay. 40 5 Although the Board subsequently affirmed the judge's ruling on the basis of Taracorp, it did not
dispute his finding that "there was no evidence that the employee was
discharged on the basis of information obtained during the unlawful interview[]."40 6
b. The Kraft Presumption Made it Difficult to Discipline Employees for
Misconduct
Despite the analysis in the preceding cases, the fact that a denial of
union representation may taint "not only the conduct of the interview but
any investigation subsequently conducted ' ' 4 07 undoubtedly did make it

398. See id. at 974-75.
399. Seeid. at 971.
400.
401.
402.

Id.
285 N.L.R.B. 49 (1987).
See id. at 53.

403. Although the Board's decision in Axelson was issued after Taracorphad "overruled Kraft
Foods," id. at 49 n. 1, the administrative law judge's decision predated Taracorp.See id. at 49 (noting that the administrative law judge's decision was issued in "September 1981," more than three
years before Taracorpwas decided).
404. Id. at 53.
405.

See id.

406. Id. at 49 n.l.
407. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292 n.8 (1978), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 275 N.L.R.B.

148, 150 (1985) (describing circumstances in which information obtained in violation of Weingarten "taints the [employer's] lawful evidence"), enforced sub nom. Communication Workers, 784
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difficult for many employers to avoid an award of make-whole relief
Inc., 4 09 another Board
under the Kraft test. 40 8 As explained in 41Texaco,
0
Kraft:
as
day
same
the
on
decision issued
It is extremely difficult to discern how an employer could (1) decide to
[investigate] employee misconduct through an interview of the accused
employee, (2) affirmatively solicit from the employee information relating to the misconduct, and (3) in fact succeed in obtaining perhaps
the most telling information available to merit a decision to discipline
in any
and yet be found not to have based its disciplinary
• . decision,
411
way, on the information it was so successful in securing.
This suggests that the Board in Taracorp was correct in overruling
Kraft to the extent the employer had been required to prove that the employee was not prejudiced by its unlawful interview (that is, to the extent
the Board effectively assumed the employee was prejudiced), 412 despite
the questionable reasoning upon which its decision to overrule Kraft was
actually based.4 13 Indeed, even before Taracorpwas decided, one Board
member maintained that the Board had effectively altered the Krafi approach by requiring the General Counsel, acting on behalf of an employee,414 to "establish affirmatively" that the employer's disciplinary
decision was based upon information obtained in its unlawful inter-

F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1986).
408. See Truesdale, supra note 19, at 176 (asserting that Kraft placed "a heavy burden" on the
employer). One Board member, dissenting from the Board's decision in Kraft, asserted that "the
majority's analysis... [would] almost inevitably result in a finding that the employer has not met
its burden." Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598, 600 (1980) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part),
overruled in Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222-23 (1984). Indeed, he maintained that an employer was likely to be able to establish that it did not rely on information obtained at an unlawful
interview only in those rare instances in which its disciplinary decision had already been made when
it conducted the unlawful interview. See id. (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part).
409. 251 N.L.R.B. 633 (1980), enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981).
410. See Dobranski, supra note 67, at 325 n.171 (discussing Texaco and "other cases decided
the same day" as Kraft).
411. Texaco, 251 N.L.R.B. at 638 (Fanning & Penello, Members, concurring).
412. See, e.g., NLRB v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 730 F.2d 166, 174 (5th Cir. 1984) (leaving
open the question of whether "the employer properly bears [the] burden" of proving that its disciplinary decision "was not based on information obtained at the [unlawful] interview").
413. See, e.g., Kraft, 251 N.L.R.B. at 599 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part) (asserting that
a limitation on the Board's ability to award make-whole relief where the employer "has disciplined
an employee for conduct which was [the] subject of an interview conducted in violation of Weingarten" is "neither required by Section 10(c) nor justified").
414. See generally Zum Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683, 692 n.15 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing "cases [holding] that under the Act the employee (i.e., the General Counsel) bore the burden of
proof').
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view.415
Significantly, this is essentially the approach follo.ved by the Sixth
Circuit in GeneralMotors Corp. v. Allen,4t 6 one of the cases that, as discussed earlier,417 the Board in Taracorp relied upon when it overruled
Kraft.4 18 In General Motors, the Board had awarded make-whole relief
to an employee whose Weingarten rights were violated on the ground

that the employer had "not sustained its burden of establishing that it
would have discharged
[the employee] even in the absence of the unlaw9
41

ful interview.,
Despite acknowledging that the employer had not established that it
discharged the employee solely on the basis of information obtained independently from the unlawful interview,420 the Sixth Circuit refused to
enforce the Board's remedial order.42 ' The court reasoned that because
the employee could have been discharged on the basis of evidence obtained prior to the interview,4 22 the employer should not be "penalized"
for giving him an opportunity to explain that evidence.423 The court thus
effectively held that make-whole relief is precluded by Section 10(c)
unless the employee shows that the employer's only evidence of "cause"
for discipline was obtained in, or as the result of, an unlawful investigatory interview.424
The Sixth Circuit's reasoning is consistent with the Board's own
analysis in United States Postal Service,42 5 where it refused to award
make-whole relief to an employee who was terminated after admitting to
theft in an interview conducted in violation of Weingarten. 6 The Board

415. ITT Lighting Fixtures, 261 N.L.R.B. 229, 232 n.16 (1982) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting
in part).
416. 674 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1982).
417. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text,
418. See Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 222 n.1 1 (1984).
419. Gen. Motors Corp., 251 N.L.R.B. 850, 850 n.2 (1980), enforced in partand enforcement
denied in part, 674 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1982).
420. See Gen Motors Corp., 674 F.2d at 578.
421. See id. at 577-78 ("[W]e decline to enforce the backpay and reinstatement remedy imposed by the NLRB ....).
422. Id. at 578. In particular, the court noted that the employer could have based the termination on a security officer's report prepared prior to the employee's unlawful interview that contained
"independent evidence of good cause for discharge." Id.
423. Id.; cf Truesdale, supra note 19, at 176 (stating that "there is every indication that the
employee's fate was no worse than it would have been had there been no interview at all" where an
employer with "enough evidence to justify ... disciplinary action" nevertheless proceeds to interview the employee "to get his or her side of the story").
424. See Gen. Motors Corp., 674 F.2d at 578.
425. 254N.L.R.B. 703 (1981).
426. See id.at 703, 707.
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based its decision on the fact that the terminated employee was the last
person interviewed in the employer's investigation, and the information
the employer obtained in its earlier interviews of other employees, who
were eyewitnesses to the theft, was sufficient to warrant termination
even in the absence of the employee's admission.427
Under those circumstances, the Board indicated that the most that
could be said was that the information the employer obtained in its
unlawful interview had not "deterred" it from terminating the employee.42 8 In other words, even though the right to representation recognized in Weingarten is premised in part upon the belief that the presence
of a union representative might deter an employer from taking disciplinary action,429 the Board in Postal Service assumed that, even without
the employee's confession,4 30 the employer would have terminated him
for theft because he had
also been implicated in that misconduct "by the
43 1
statements of others.,
The Board was able to reach this result only by ignoring the employer's burden under Kraft of demonstrating affirmatively that it would
have imposed the same discipline even if its investigatory interview had
been conducted in accordance with Weingarten.4 32 In this regard, it is
427. See id. at 703 ("[l~t is evident that the investigation leading to [the] discharge was undertaken as a result of information received from eyewitnesses.., whose accounts were alone sufficient to justify the disciplinary action taken.").
428. Id. at 704 n.2. But cf Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 612, 615 n.17 (1980),
enforcement denied, 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding it "highly improbable that the [employer]
did not rely on [an employee's] ... confession in its decision to suspend and terminate him").
429. See Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1048, 1056 (1982) ("If the right to union representation at investigatory interviews is the basic right described in Weingarten,... then one can only
conclude that such representation, if granted, might possibly affect the outcome of such interviews."); cf Airco Alloys, 249 N.L.R.B. 524, 526 (1980) ("[T]he fact that the Union may be powerless to alter or reverse the discipline does not obviate its representative function, where requested, in
attempting to insure [sic] that management's decision on the discipline is fairly reached with all pertinent facts considered.").
430. See generally N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 277, 302 (1992) ("[T]he union representative's role in actively assisting an employee ... includes the right to protect the employee from
making unwarranted admissions of improper conduct, which might lead to the discipline of that employee.").
431. United States Postal Serv., 254 N.L.R.B. at 704 n.2; cf Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 246
N.L.R.B. 1007, 1019 (1979) ("[S]peculative suggestions ...that union representatives[] permitted
to participate [in investigatory interviews] might have convinced the concerned employer to mitigate or waive discipline for certain workers ... can hardly be considered sufficiently persuasive to
warrant determination that their disciplinary suspensions stemmed.., from [an] improper denial of
Weingarten rights.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
432. Indeed, one Board member specifically noted that the Board's decision "undermined its
own criteria for determining the appropriate remedy [for a Weingarten violation] as ...stated in
Kraft Foods," which made it "incumbent upon the [employer] to demonstrate affirmatively that it
did not rely on the information gained from [its unlawful] interview." United States Postal Serv.,
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impossible to reconcile the Board's decision in Postal Service with its
prior analysis in Ohio Masonic Home.43 In that case, the Board concluded that in cases where an employer elects to interview an employee
after receiving complaints or gathering other evidence sufficient to discipline the employee,434 it could "only conclude that [the employee] was
[disciplined] because she did not have a satisfactory explanation in response to the complaints, rather than merely because there had been
some complaints."43S
Labor arbitrators have also occasionally placed the burden on the
employee (or the union representing an employee) 436 to prove that an
employer's denial of union representation prejudiced the employee.437 In
United States Sugar Corp. v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists,438 for example,
the arbitrator relied on Kraft in upholding the discipline of an employee
whose Weingarten rights were allegedly violated, 439 because the union
representing the employee failed to establish that the discharge decision

254 N.L.R.B. at 704 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part).
433. 251 N.L.R.B. 606 (1980).
434. See generally Truesdale, supranote 19, at 176:
A Weingarten violation often occurs when the employer already has at least some evidence of employee misbehavior. In some cases, it is evident that the employer had
enough evidence to justify the disciplinary action it took. Nevertheless, some employers
with an airtight case will still interview the employee, perhaps to get his or her side of
the story or to provide an opportunity to "come clean."
435. Ohio Masonic Home, 251 N.L.R.B. at 607; cf PPG Indus., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 & n.2
(1980) (describing an employer that "originally told [its employee] he was discharged, but changed
the discipline to a written reprimand upon investigating the matter further and asking [him] questions about his alleged misconduct").
436. Many collective bargaining agreements permit arbitration to be invoked "only by the union, and not by an individual" employee. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 855 (1971)
(Jenkins, Member, dissenting); see, e.g., Mudge v. United States, 308 F.3d 1220, 1222 n. 1 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (discussing a bargaining agreement that "authorize[d] the union, rather than the individual
employee, to take a matter to arbitration"). In that event, the union is responsible for presenting the
aggrieved employee's case to the arbitrator. See generally Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309,
1320 (10th Cir. 1981) ("Arbitration procedures supplement the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative by assigning it responsibility for the handling of individual grievances.").
437. This result is occasionally premised upon the parties' incorporation of the right to union
representation into a collective bargaining agreement, because "[tlhe burden of proving a contractual violation on the part of [the] Employer rests with the Union." Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs. v. Am.
Fed. of State, County & Municipal Employees, Local 561, 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 928, 936
(1982) (Deitsch, Arb.). See generally Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp. v. Int'l Union, Sec. Police & Fire Prof'ls, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 769, 774 (2002) (O'Grady, Arb.) ("[Where] the...
matter concerns an allegation of a contract violation, the Union traditionally in arbitration bears the
burden of proof ... ").
438. 82 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 604 (1984) (Hanes, Arb.).
439. Id. at 607 ("The Union states that at the time the Grievant was first interviewed... regarding the incident he requested Union representation but same was denied him.").
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was based on information obtained in the employer's allegedly unlawful
interview. 440 The arbitrator explained:
For... the Union to prevail [it] must demonstrate the decision of the
Company to discharge the Grievant was based on facts gained through
[its] interview directly with the Grievant. In this case there is no question that [the Company] did not gain the information [it] used for discharge purposes through the Grievant but did gain such information
from other sources.441
Even in Board proceedings, requiring Weingarten victims to show
prejudice, obtaining make-whole relief 442 should not be precluded by
Section 10(c) of the NLRA,443 which "does not speak to burdens of persuasion, fruits of violations, exclusionary rules, and the other paraphernalia of trials and inferences." 4 In other words, as an aspect of its inherent control over its own proceedings," 5 the Board has the authority to
"establish presumptions about causal chains," 4 6 to allocate burdens of

440. See id. at 609; cf Ind. Convention Ctr. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Union, Local 400, 98
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 713, 721 (1992) (Wolff, Arb.) (upholding the discharge of a grievant who
was denied union representation in an investigatory interview because the employer "probably
would have fired the Grievant anyway").
441. US. Sugar Corp., 82 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 609 (citing Kraft).
442. In this context, "prejudice" would be shown by establishing that the employee would not
have been discharged or suspended for "cause" in the absence of the employer's unlawful interview.
See, e.g., La. Council No. 17, 250 N.L.R.B. 880, 894, 900 (1980) (suggesting that an employee who
was terminated for cause "was not harmed or prejudiced" by the employer's denial of his Weingarten rights if "there are no facts to support a finding that [his] discharge resulted from, or was a consequence of, the.., meeting at which he was denied union representation").
443. Indeed, as originally drafted by the House, the proviso to Section 10(c) "placed the burden
squarely on the General Counsel," acting on behalf of an employee claiming to have been terminated in violation of the Act, "to prove that [the] employee was not discharged for cause." NLRB v.
N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 295 (2d Cir. 1983). In the view of at least one court, Congress'
failure to include that language in the proviso as ultimately adopted "served only to eliminate a redundancy with regard to the nature of the burden of proof while preserving the House's intent with
respect to its allocation." Zum Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683, 692 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis
added). Although that court was specifically addressing the Board's burden-shifting approach to
determining whether an employer had cause for terminating an employee in "mixed, dual or pretextual motive" cases, id. at 686, "[t]he burden shift established in Kraft is very similar." Dobranski,
supranote 67, at 325 n.165.
444. Communication Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 1986); cf Standard Oil
Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 783, 791 (1950) ("Section 10(c) does not operate to overturn the well established
principle of law that the burden of establishing an affirmative defense is on the party alleging it.").
445. See Alwin Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d 133, 143 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Stow Mfg. Co.,
103 N.L.R.B. 1280, 1306 n.36 (1953).
446. Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 850 (citing NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462
U.S. 393, 402-03 (1983)).
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proof in accordance with those presumptions,44 7 and ultimately to fashion appropriate remedies in unfair labor practice cases in which employees are able to satisfy the evidentiary burdens the Board has allocated to
them.448 Although there are countervailing policy arguments supporting
the Board's allocation of the respective burdens in Kraft,4 49 requiring
Weingarten victims to prove that they were prejudiced by an employer's
unlawful conduct is more responsive to the policy concerns that
prompted the Board to overrule that decision.450

447. See Garrett R.R. Car & Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 731, 741 (3d Cir. 1982)
("[P]lacing the burden on [a particular party] is a type of decision allowable for an agency which
has the primary responsibility for formulating remedies designed to minimize the impact of unfair
labor practices."). But cf NLRB v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 293 (2d Cir. 1983)
("[D]eciding the proper allocation of burdens is not within the Board's special competence .... ).
448. In Alwin Mfg. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 646 (1998), enforced, 192 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
the Board held that it has the "inherent authority" to formulate remedies for an employer's unfair
labor practices even when it does "not have the [statutory] authority, under Sec[tion] 10(c) of the
Act, to [do so]." Id. at 647 n.6. But see NLRB v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 983 F.2d 705, 717 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Board has broad discretion to devise
remedies that will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, to be sure, but the
Board has no discretion to do that which [Section 10(c) of] the Act says it shall not do.").
449. For one thing, Kraft placed the burden of proof with respect to the issue of prejudice on
the party-the employer-whose "own unlawful conduct" prompted the need to determine whether
it would have imposed the same discipline even if it had complied with Weingarten. United States
Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 154 (1979). If the employer's Weingarten violation has "created a
situation where it [is] impossible to determine what would have happened had the employee been
granted his statutory right," it may well be appropriate to require the employer to "suffer the consequences" of its unlawful conduct. La. Council No. 17, 250 N.L.R.B. 880, 900 (1980); see also Pac.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1048, 1056 (1982) (noting that where the employer's conduct "has
caused the uncertainty as to what [the] effect [of union representation] would have been, it is only
fair that the uncertainty be resolved against [it]"). In this sense, the Kraft approach reflects the
Board's general policy "that the party which violated the Act should bear the greater burden .... "
Iron Workers Local 377, 326 N.L.R.B. 375, 375 (1998); see also Arthur F. Derse, Sr., 173 N.L.R.B.
214, 223 (1968) (stating that it is the employer "who should bear the brunt of... the consequences
of its unfair labor practices .... ").
450. The Board overruled Kraft in part because the imposition of make-whole relief in cases in
which employers have disciplined employees "for reasons wholly independent of any unfair labor
practice" provides "a windfall to [the] employees." Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1984).
In this regard, awarding make-whole relief to employees who fail to establish that a denial of union
representation "tainted the validity" of the evidence upon which their discipline was based may be
"rewarding [them] for wrongdoing." Montgomery Ward & Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 826, 832, 833 n.15,
enforced in part and enforcement denied in part,664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Pac. Tel.
& Tel., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1056 (acknowledging the contention that where "discipline was imposed
because of the misconduct which prompted the investigatory interview rather than because the employees asserted a right protected under the Act, a reinstatement and backpay remedy would ...
award the employees with an undeserved benefit").
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VII. CONCLUSION

The overruling of Kraft has been described as an example of the
Board reversing course as its political makeup changes. 45 ' Future
changes in the Board's composition could likewise result in the emergence of a new Board majority favoring a return to the Kraft approach.4 52 Indeed, one Board member who had "not passed on the Taracorp rule in previous cases" recently suggested just this possibility,4 53
stating that she "would consider overruling Taracorp" in order to award
reinstatement to an employee whose Weingarten rights were violated.454
In this regard, the Board's discretion in fashioning remedies to be
imposed for an employer's unfair labor practices is particularly broad, 455
as is its authority to modify a remedial approach it has previously
adopted.4 56 Thus, just as the Board "was entitled to adopt the Taracorp
451. See Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L.
REv. 163, 178 & n.78 (2002); see also Communication Workers v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 848 (7th
Cir. 1986) (noting that "the Board changed course" when it "overruled Kraft Foods"); N.J. Bell Tel.
Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 42, 55 (1990) (noting that the Board's decision in Taracorp "revers[ed] prior
precedent").
452. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ensign Elec. Div. of Harvey Hubble, Inc., 767 F.2d 1100, 1102 n.l
(4th Cir. 1985) (describing a Board decision "coming on the heels of changes in the composition of
the Board... [that] was a clear example of an administrative body reviewing its earlier decisions
which were replete with arguments on all sides of the issue, and creating a new majority to support
an earlier viewpoint...."); see also Spencer v. NLRB, 548 F. Supp. 256, 264 (D.D.C. 1982) (asserting that "existing Board precedent is inevitably, and necessarily, subject to some modification as
the composition of the Board changes in response to electoral developments").
453. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., No. 17-CA-21366, 2002 WL 31717856, at *6 n.5 (N.L.R.B.
Nov. 20, 2002) (Liebman, Member, dissenting); see also Alitel Pa., Inc., No. 6-CA-26073R, 1995
NLRB LEXIS 362, at *3 n.2 (Apr. 26, 1995) ("Under current Board policy, an employee terminated
for cause in a situation involving violation of Weingarten rights is not entitled to individual relief by
way of reinstatement, backpay or otherwise.") (emphasis added) (citing Taracorp).
454. Southwestern Bell Tel., 2002 WL 31717856, at *6 n.5 (Liebman, Member, dissenting). In
addition, one commentator who was of the view that the Kraft approach "addresse[d] the legitimate
disciplinary concern of the employer while still protecting the rights of the employee who was
forced to take part in the unlawful interview" has asserted that changes in the Board's composition
"create some uncertainty as to the future direction of the Board in this area of the law." Dobranski,
supra note 67, at 326, 327 n. 177.
455. See Truck Drivers & Helpers Local No. 728 v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 986, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
("The Board's wide discretion is at its broadest in matters of remedial policy.") (citing Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1964)); cf Sinclair Glass Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 362,
363 (1971) ("It is a principle too well established in Board law to require citation of authority that a
question of remedy is within the discretion of the Board.").
456. In InternationalBrotherhood of Operative Potters v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir.
1963), for example, the court noted that the Board has "broad discretion in framing remedies which
will effectuate the policies of the Act," as well as the "authority to change [a] longstanding [remedial] policy." Id. at 761 (emphasis added). The courts therefore "cannot regard changes in remedial
mechanisms as beyond the Board's power so long as they reasonably effectuate the congressional
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doctrine as an exercise of its discretion over remedies for violations of
the Act, ''4 57 it retains the authority to return to an approach in which it
remedies Weingarten violations by "apply[ing] an exclusionary rule, as
it did in Kraft.' 458
However, if the Board does elect to abandon the debatable interpre459 and return to Kraft's
tation of Section 10(c) it adopted in Taracorp
more traditional approach to remedying Weingarten violations, 460 it
should modify that approach to require employees seeking an award of
make-whole relief to prove that they were prejudiced by the employer's
unlawful conduct. 46' By leaving open the prospect of make-whole relief,462 this approach, like the one employed by the FLRA, 463 would be
more likely to deter future Weingarten violations than the limited cease4 64 and thus would
and-desist order presently available under Taracorp,
policies underlying the statutory scheme." 1d.; see also Garrett R.R. Car & Equip., Inc. v. NLRB,
683 F.2d 731, 742 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Even if on policy grounds, we might have let the 'old rule'
stand, we will not intrude on the administrative process so deeply that the [Board] is precluded
from.., changing standards in an effort to implement its [remedial] responsibilities under the
Act.").
457. Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 849; cf Silverman, supra note 170, at 477 n.50
("[lit is not surprising that the Board overruled Kraft Foods in Taracorp.").
458. Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 851. See generally Ereno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239,
241 (1975) (Penello, Member, dissenting) ("[S]tare decisis plays a more limited role in the administrative process, as compared to the judicial process .... ").
459. See, e.g., Communication Workers, 784 F.2d at 849 (noting the contention that the Board
in Taracorp"misunderstood the meaning of § 10(c) of the Act").
460. See Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 91, 95 (1980) ("In Weingarten cases, the Board
has generally ordered restoration of the status quo ante."). Even the Taracorp Board referred to the
award of make-whole relief as its "traditional ... remedy in such cases." Taracorp Indus., 273
N.L.R.B. 221, 223 n.12 (1984); see also I1l. Bell Tel. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 148, 150 (1985) (discussing
the availability, under Kraft, of "the conventional reinstatement-backpay remedy which normally
arises in [a Section] 8(a)(1) discharge case"), enforced sub noma.Communication Workers, 784 F.2d
847 (7th Cir. 1986); Consol, Casinos Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. 988, 1015 (1983) (describing the "test...
set forth in Kraft Foods" as "the Board's standard remedy analysis in Weingartenviolations").
461. See Iron Workers Local Union 377, 326 N.L.R.B. 375, 394 (1998) ("[A] make-whole
remedy is appropriate only where there exists ... some basis for supposing that the grievant suffered 'damage' from the [unlawful conduct] for which he or she should be made whole.") (discussing United Rubber Workers, Local 250, 290 N.L.R.B. 817, 818-19 (1988)).
462. As under Kraft, the remedial approach suggested here would only result in the issuance of
the Board's "standard cease-and-desist order" in Weingarten cases in which the employer "learned
nothing it did not already know from its unlawful interview." Radisson Muehlebach Hotel, 273
N.L.R.B. 1464, 1481 (1985).
463. See United States Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 35 F.L.R.A. 431, 448 (1990) ("By
making the right to representation ultimately inescapable, [the FLRA's] remedy ...provide[s] an
additional incentive to [employers] to afford representation rights and diminish[es] any advantage to
denying the right at the outset.").
464. Compare Wellman Indus., Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 204, 207-08 (1976) (discussing the contention that "[a] cease and desist order is an insufficient remedy," and that "[o]nly a make-whole order
can ... deter the employer from further unfair labor practices") with Montgomery Ward & Co., 273
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better serve the policies underlying the NLRA.465
On the other hand, by creating a presumption against an award of
make-whole relief,466 the approach suggested here would preserve the
employer's right to discipline an employee for misconduct 4 67 unless it is
affirmatively shown to have done so on the basis of information it obtained by violating the employee's Section 7 right to union representation. 468 In accordance with the analysis in Weingarten469 and the policies
underlying the NLRA itself,470 this approach thus attempts to address
"the problem of accommodating the rights of employees under Section 7
to engage in concerted activities with the right clearly given an employer
under Section 10(c) to protect [its] business by discharging an employee
N.L.R.B. 1226, 1227 (1984):
In Taracorp,... the Board established the appropriate remedial scheme for [unfair labor
practices] arising out of unlawful Weingarten interviews. In that decision, the Board held
that a make-whole remedy is inappropriate and that the proper remedy is [the cease-anddesist order] normally prescribed for violations of Section 8(a)(1).
465. See Buddies Super Markets, 223 N.L.R.B. 950, 956 (1976) ("The purposes of the Act are,
of course, better advanced by deterring the commission of unfair labor practices than by remedying
them once committed.").
466. In Garrett R.R. Car & Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1982), the court observed that a Board decision placing the burden of proof on a particular party creates "a rebuttable
presumption." Id. at 742; see also Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 855 (9th Cir. 2001)
(noting that an "allocation of the burden of proof has the effect of creating a rebuttable presumption").
467. In this sense, the approach would retain that aspect of Taracorp holding that "an employee denied his Weingarten rights is not entitled to reinstatement and backpay if he has been discharged for misconduct." Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 680 n.14 (2000), enforced
in part and rev'd in part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904 (2002). See
generally Okla. Furniture Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 771, 782 (1953) ("The Board has long recognized
that... the Act does not circumscribe the right of an employer to select, discharge, or discipline
[its] employees, or to otherwise alter their employment status, for reasons other than those forbidden
by the Act.").
468. This result is consistent with the analysis in Weingarten itself, where the Court noted that
has] ... without such additional
an employer is "free to act on the basis of whatever information [it
facts as might [be] gleaned through [an unlawful] interview." NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. 251, 259 (1975) (quoting Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 199 (1972)).
469. The Board has noted that "the construction of Section 7 affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Weingarten represents a balance between employer 'prerogatives' in investigating and disciplining
misconduct and the right of employees to band together when their terms and conditions of employment are threatened by those 'prerogatives."' Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1048, 1049
(1982) (emphasis added), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 711 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.
1983); see also Millcraft Furniture Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 593, 596 n.6 (1987) ("[T]he Supreme Court in
Weingarten intended to strike a balance between employee rights and legitimate employer prerogatives.").
470. See Caterpillar Tractor Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1331 (1985) ("The Act strives to achieve
a balance between the right of employees to organize for mutual aid and protection and 'the equally
undisputed right of employers to maintain order in their establishments."') (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945)).
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471. Vernon Livestock Trucking Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1805, 1809-10 (1968); cf Ill. Bell Tel.
Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 932, 935 n.20 (1980) (advocating a "procedure [that] remedies the unfair labor
practice[s], while preserving [the employer's] right to discipline and discharge its employees"), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982). See generally Consol.
Casinos Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. 988, 1009 (1983) ("Weingarten and subsequent cases have attempted
to balance the conflicting interests of the parties and have sought. .. a reasonable accommodation
between those interests.").
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